Distinction of the Buddha's Teachings 

from Brahmanism and Sramanism 

Bhikkhu Thich Nhat-Tu

thichnhattu@yahoo.com 

---

I. Preamble 

The major philosophical traditions before the rise of Buddhism can be classified into two major traditions, Brahmanism and 'Srama.nism. They again can be categorised into the following schools of thought: Brahmanism, Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism. The last five which are grouped under the Sramanic tradition are opposed to that of the first. Brahmanism, the orthodox (aastika) school of thought, based its metaphysical theories on the Vedas as the final authority in all matters. Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism, the heterodoxy schools of thought (nastikas), opposed to the orthodox Brahmanical system and its Vedas. In searching for, as well as, establishing a new socially human moralism, the Buddha had renounced all these metaphysical doctrines prevailed before and at his time. The Brahmanical doctrines of the self (aatman) and ultimate reality (brahman), the hedonistic materialism of the Cavarka, the Aajiivika theory of inherent nature (svabhaava), the Jaina theory of action (kiriyavaada) and absolute scepticism of Sa~njaya are rejected by the Buddha on the ground that they do not conduce to moralism and final liberation. 

II. Distinction of Buddhism from Brahmanism 

1. Buddhism, as a new philosophical way of life, emerges as a counter-movement against ethical and metaphysical doctrines of Brahmanism. Buddhism being a naastika completely rejects the authority of the Vedas and disproving the Brahmaa as the lord of all creatures. This epistemologically entails denouncing the practice of sacrifice as nonsensical and immoral in terms of ethics. According to the Buddha, the Brahmanical claim that the Vedas, created by Brahmaa for protection of the moral law,[1] are Sruti, [2] divine revelations and the final authority each in every thing is untenable. The Buddha has indirectly rejected this claim arguing that if no teachers of the Vedic tradition have had vision of Brahmaa, the so-called creator of the Vedas and this universe, the talk of Brahmaa is a blind talk, just as when a string of blind men clinging to one another, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle see, nor can the hindmost see.[3] In the Caanki Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya [4] the Buddha again refutes the authority of the Vedas, the ancient scriptural statements (poraa.nam mantapadam) as true while others are false, saying that because no braahma.nas so far have attained personally direct knowledge of the truth of their statement, such a claim on authority of the Vedas as truth is just a groundless faith with no substance whatsoever (ghoso yeva kho eso lokasmii), or a blind tradition (andhave.nu).[5] The Buddha goes further rejecting the claim declaring that this falsity is not merely based on faith (payiruupaasanti) but also based on the other four grounds, viz., inclination, report, consideration of reasons and reflection on and approval of an opinion.[6] 

2. The Buddha also rejects the cosmological theories of Braahmanism. If Brahmaa in the Vedas is considered as the omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, infinite and ultimate reality, or being regarded as a mere appearance, a name-and-form,[7] which is one, non-dual, undifferentiated,[8] non-temporal,[9] non-spatial, non-causal, beginningless, endless,[10] ungrounded, essenceless, transcendental, invisible, imperceptible, indefinable, incomprehensive and unknowable[11] he is substituted with the law of dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratiitayasamupaada) by the Buddha.[12] In its general formula "so this being, that becomes; from the arising of this that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases,"[13] this law explains that all phenomena and everything in this world are both conditioned (paticcasamuppanna// pratiityasamutpanna) and conditioning (pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratityasamutpaada); they are, therefore, relative and interdependent without the first uncaused causer, i.e. Brahmaa. Being endowed with mutually arising characteristics, this doctrine opposes theories of past determinism [14] (pubbekatahetu), of theistic determinism (issara-nimmaana hetu) and of non-causation and non-condition (ahetu-apaccaya-vaada).[15] From this doctrine the characteristics of existence can be understood as the causally natural law: "Whether there be or not an appearance of a Tathaagata, this causal law of nature,[16] this orderly fixing of things[17] prevails, namely, all phenomena[18] are impermanent, misery and unsubstantial.[19] The principle of dependent origination (paticcasamuppaada) is called the middle doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m deseti) because it avoids the extremely biased theories, as mentioned above. 

3. The Brahmanical theory of self (aatman)[20] as the central theme expounded in the Upani.sads is also refuted. The so-called aatman is in fact only the physico-psychological combination of the five aggregates or groups (pa~ncakkhandha), viz., the body-group (ruupakkhandha), the feeling-group (vedanaakkhandha), the perception-group (sa~n~naakkhandha), the activities-group (samkhaakkhandha), and the consciousness-group (vi~n~naanakkhandha).[21] These five aggregates (pa~ncakkhandha) are all compounded and all conditioned. Being so, they are all impermanent and all constantly changing. That is to say, they are of dependently arising and passing away, so that there is nothing in the nature of a stable, persisting and eternal entity to be found in them. "Whatever is impermanent is suffering, is no-self."[22] This fact of fivefold combination of a personality is "true, not false an unalterable."[23] The Buddha emphasized that the aatman is like a mountain stream, which flows fast and is forever changing.[24] There is no being (sat), there is only becoming (bhava) in it. The arising (uppaada), disappearance (vyaya) and changing of what exists (a~n~natatha) are the three signs of compounded things.[25] The belief in a permanent soul (aatman) not only negates the activities of moral life but also falls in a form of grasping, a hindrance to spiritual liberation.[26] 

4. The fourfold caste society of Brahmanism, mistakenly based on the concept of Brahmaa as the creator of the universe, is completely denounced by the Buddha. According to the Buddha any claim of superiority of Braahman-class over the other classes is untenably social bias for getting economic privilege and gain. Such an inequality of Brahmanism is strongly attacked by the Buddha on the following grounds. Biologically, man is of one species [27] and therefore any claim on the divine origin is refuted.[28] Ethically, all human beings are equal by birth, sex and race. Only their moral conduct, which is directed by the intention or choice (cetanaa), makes them noble or ignoble, exacted or low. According to this moral principle, man’s activities and tendencies make him a farmer (who cultivates the land), a craftsman (who produces utensils and instruments), a servant (who serves others for a living), a thief (who takes to stealing), a soldier (who serves in the army), a teacher (who learns and imparts knowledge to others), a king (who rules a country), a minister (who helps the king in governing the country). In short, one is a ruler (khattiya), a priest(braahma.na), a businessman (vessa) or a servant (sudda) is due to one’s moral behaviour and actual activities. By birth one is not a braahma.na or an out-caste (vasala). It is his activities that make him so.[29] The Brahman’s claim for being superior in society is criticised by the Buddha, who proves that all braahma.nas are in fact womb-born of bramin women in the natural way, not of the mouth of the Brahmaa, the Creator.[30] 

5. The soteriological theory of Brahmanism, as presented in the Vedas and the Upani.sad, through purificatory bathing, sacrifices as well as practice of severe asceticism [31] is rejected by the Buddha. The Buddha clearly teaches that neither purificatory bathing nor self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga) [32] can bring about heavenly existence (sagga), purity (suddhi) or emancipation (vimutti). Bathing oneself in the water of the so-called sacred rivers as believed of capable of washing away sins and moral evils in the Vedas is regarded as foolish act in Buddhism. The classic example of the Buddhist argument against this is that if the water had such divinely purificatory powers, the aquatic shatters such as fishes, frogs, tortoises, crocodiles, water-snakes etc., would have become saint or would have reborn in the heaven, for their constant being in such waters.[33] Disproving the possibility of washing away sins from bathing in the holy waters, the Buddha reads a new meaning into the existing rite introducing of bathing without waters, such as bathing in the Noble Eightfold path. Such bathing is capable of conducting to liberation.[34] 

6. Ritualism, ceremonialism and sacrifices (ya~n~na//yaj~na) [35] are the most prominent features of Brahmanism as reflected in the .Rgveda and the Brahma.nas. These are most important part of Brahmanical religion. They govern condition of human as well as animals. "Thing animate or inanimate are all under the magical spell of ceremony. Gods, men, living beings, lifeless things can all be equally moved through the power of prayer or sacrifice."[36] Their existence was for the sake of the ceremony. The practice of human sacrifice was also found in the Brahma.nas. A Brahma.na named 'Sunah'sepa about to be sacrificed in lieu of the son of a king was saved. In the another passage of the Braahma.nas I. 8, this kind of immoral practice is mentioned in detail. The gods killed a man for their victim. But form him thus killed the part, which was fit for a sacrifice went out and entered a horse. Thence the horse became an animal for being sacrificed. The gods the killed the horse, but for the part fir for being sacrificed went out of it and entered an ox. The gods the killed the ox . . . sheep, goal etc. The sacrificial part remained for the longest time in the goat, thence it became pre-eminently fit for being sacrificed. Such bloody sacrifices were considered to be necessary to propitiate gods.[37] In the Pali texts [38] five kinds of bloody sacrifices are frequently referred, viz., horse-sacrifice, human-sacrifice, peg-thrown site sacrifice, drinking of victory or strength, and the bolts-withdrawn sacrifice or universal sacrifice.[39] In the Discourse of the Wrong Sacrifice and the Right (Kutadanta Sutta) of the Diigha Nikaaya [40] these immoral Brahmanical sacrifices with its three modes and its accessories of sixteen kinds [41] are strongly criticized by the Buddha, who introduces new kinds of sacrifice, which is not bloodshed, less difficulty and trouble, but bringing greater fruit and advantage in this life and hereafter. These consist of (i) offering to moral sangha including individuals of high moral, (ii) putting up of a dwelling place (vihaara) on behalf of the sangha in all the four direction, (iii) taking refuge in the Buddha, his dhamma and his sangha; (iv) observing the five moral principles, namely, abstinence from destroying life, from taking what is not given, from sexual misconduct, from telling lies and from drinking alcohol, (v) observing the minor morality, (vi) developing confidence, (vii) controlling the five senses, (viii) cultivating mindfulness, (ix) Living in content and solitude, (x) cutting off five hindrances and cultivating the four jhaanas. Thus, the amoral ceremonialism and sacrificism of Brahamnism is contrastedly substituted with the socially human moralism of Buddhism, such as love, sympathy, liberality and humanity etc. 

7. The Pali texts refer a variety of asceticism,[42] such as bovine ascetics (go-vatika) undertaking cow-practice (go-vata) putting a horn on their head and tying a tail and doing everything done by cows, and canine ascetics (kukkuravatika) undertaking the dog-practice, by dogs.[43] In denouncing these useless practices, the Buddha points out their cause and the motive as ignorance and desired of attention and fame.[44] So far as its consequence is concerned, the Buddha pointed out that, these practices, despite of torturing the ascetic, with no profitable state and realisation of vision and knowledge,[45] would lead them to rebirth in animal world (niraya).[46] Asceticism is not the means of escaping the saasaara. It is low, vulgar, base, ignoble and not conductive to good (hiina, gaama, pothujjanika, anariya, anattasaahita). The Buddha categorises two kinds of austerities: one torments the self (attantapa), torments others (parantapa), and torments both self and others (attantapo ca parantapo ca), and the other is one that does not torture the body, but self-discipline, the discipline of the five senses,[47] that is the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path, leading the practitioner to his final liberation. Among the two, the Buddha recommends the latter and considers it as the basis of the life of chastity and fundamental ascetic virtue in Buddhism.[48] 

III. Distinction of Buddhism from Sramanism 

As stated earlier that being emerged in the history of Indian thought as a new doctrine and practice, Buddhism is naturally different from and opposed to those of old as well as contemporary systems, such as the six heretical traditions. So many references are found in the Pali canon showing the Buddha’s attitude, analysis and criticism of his six contemporary heretical teachers and their doctrines. The model of reference to the six heretical teachers in the Pali canon is frequently referred to as a group [49] for general purpose, and causally with a particular heretic [50] for a specific purpose of critique, though there is no evidence that the Buddha ever met with any of them face to face. Sometimes, the names of these theory founders are mentioned in full and sometimes their names are not given.[51] It should be noted here that there is the case in which some confusion is occurred in identifying the names of these heretics and their teachings.[52] There is a case, due to the complexity of their perspective theories, some theory referred to them without mentioning their perspective names becomes difficult to identify.[53] In most the cases, the criticisms of the heretics appeared in the Tipi.taka are frequently made by the Buddha, sometimes by his disciples.[54] 

In his historical visit to the Buddha, King Ajaatasattu says that he has previously paid visits to the six heretical teachers, whose doctrines are logically dissatisfied and ethically puzzled as recounted by him in the Saama~n~naphala Sutta [55] of the Diigha Nikaaya. These doctrines can be briefly summed up as follows: (i) Puura.na Kassapa propounded the doctrine of amoralist causation or inefficacy of action (akiriyavaada) denying the intentional actions capable of bearing fruits. That is to say, for him, there is no merit of doing good and no demerit of doing evil, and as a consequences this contention leads to the rejection of the validity of moral distinctions and responsibility;[56] (ii) Makkhali Gosaala denying the causes of things (ahetuvaada) and maintaining human intention and effort as powerless, advocated determinism or fatalism (niyati) of six classes of beings saying that self-purification or final emancipation could only be achievable through a fatally fixed course in transmigration (sa"msaara); (iii) Ajita Kesakambalin uphold the materialistic annihilationism (ucchedavaada/di.t.thi), which identifies the psycho-physical person (naama-ruupa) with the body (ruupa), rejecting human effort and the world hereafter (para loka). When the body is dead, it entails the total annihilation of the psycho-physical person, without the continuity of the consciousness for bearing moral retribution of his deeds done; (iv) Pakudha Kaccaayana believed in atomism of the seven eternal uncreated and noncreative substances denying psycho-ethical phenomena among with the concept of psycho-physical person. This thus entails the rejection of moral behaviour of human beings by saying that there is no crime in killing a person; (v) Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta advocates the theory of past determination (pubbekatahetu) maintaining that freedom from bonds is possible through practice of severe austerity or self-torture and observing fourfold restraint (caatuyaamasa"mvara) in four directions; (vi) Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta, an ignorant skeptic, refuted to answer, positively or negatively or both or neither, any doctrine or statement, including moral distinctions and responsibility of human beings, put to him in question. In this connection, Bhikkhu Bodhi has rightly pointed out: "In the Brahmajaala Sutta, his position is included among the "endless equivocators" or "eel-wrigglers" who are incapable of taking a definite stance on the vital philosophical questions of the day."[57] The ethical theories of six heretical teachers can be grouped under four main categories, namely, materialism (Caaraaka), naturalism (Aajiivikism), Jainism and scepticism. 

1. The Materialists are known by different names: the Caarvaakas, the Lokaayatikas or the Baarhaspatyas.[58] Ajita Kesakambali, Puura.na Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccaayana are known as the Materialists of Ancient India. Believing in natural phenomena (svabhaava), they advocate the ultimately eternal reality of matter reducing all phenomena to four (according to Ajita Kesakambali), or seven constituents (according to Pakudha Kaccaayana) namely, earth, water, fire, air,[59] happiness, suffering and life principle (jiva).[60] Materialism does not believe in the continuity of human existence after death. This logically follows the denying of moral retribution (kamma//karma), which leads to moral nihilism (natthikavaada). The Buddha therefore, regards the materialists as nihilistically amoralists (natthikavaadin). 

2. Aajiivikism, like Materialism, is a school of Naturalists. The well-known founder of this school is Makkhali Gosaala. They believe in the ultimate reality of matter, on one hand, and admit the continuity of human existence after death, on the other. Thus, they differ from Materialists from the charge of nihilism. The naturalist philosophy of Aajiivikism is covered in three important concepts, viz., fate (niyati) species (sa"ngati) and inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava).[61] Fate (niyati) is the principle of coming into existence. Species (sa"ngati) determines species of a being as a human or an animal. And inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava) determines characteristics and nature of that being. The major Buddhist rejection of Aajiivikism is on the ground that the latter does not believe in human effort on the part of individual.[62] The Aajiivikism’s rejection of human effort, thus, entails the denial of the freedom of will. Following this, purification is impossible by one’s own transformation but through the fixed cycles of existence (saasaara-suddhi). Thus it falls into the form of past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a determined theory against moralism through human effort in the present,[63] and of the theory of external causation (para kata"m).[64] 

3. Jainism as systematised by Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta, the Mahaaviira, is different from Buddhism in terms of epistemology [65] and ethics. So far as ethics is concerned, Mahaaviira seems ignore the emphasis on the importance of psychological motive (cetanaa) of the moral action (karma/kiriya), as uniquely does the Buddha. For Mahaaviira, bodily action performed with or without one’s intention will produce equal consequence. Mahaaviira appears to believe in partially biological determination and partial human action, when he says "things are partially determined and partially undetermined" (niyayaaniyayaa saataa).[66] His ethical theory can be, thus, grouped under past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a deterministic theory explaining every human experience is due to past action, which is condemned by the Buddha as against human cultivation of ethics.[67] Another ground on which the Buddha rejects Mahaaviira’s theory of moral action (kiriyavaada) is the latter’s advocating non-doing and expiating one’s past actions by extreme austerities or self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga) [68] as a means to attain liberation, which is painful, ignoble and unbeneficial.[69] 

4. Absolute scepticism was known to India philosophy very early. The founder of this school is known as Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta. He is known as a theorist of endless equivocation or an equivocationist (amraavikkhepavaadin).[70] He is extremely skeptical regarding any kinds of certainty or human knowledge. He escapes from both negative and positive statements asserting no thesis of his own, even the thesis of what is good (kusala) and evil (akusala). According to the Buddha, his scepticism is derived from both the fear of falling into error and the ignorance of giving answer to any question put to him for discussion. This extreme scepticism or sceptical doubt (vicikicchaa), according to the Buddha, is a mental hindrance, fetter or defilement, which will lead to non-development towards achievement of its intellectual and spiritual goal or to non-productivity of mind (cetokhila).[71] 

The Buddhist scripture [72] shows its suspicion to the common claim of these heretical teachers of being constantly "all-knowing, all-seeing and all-embracing knowledge-and-vision."[73] The Buddhist argument leveled against such a claim starts with a basic question that if they were so achieved why they had loosen their way when entering a new place and why they did not know how to escape from trouble while countering a fierce animal like dog, elephant, horse or a bullock, etc. Moreover, if they were really omniscient, they would have not asked people their name, clan, the name of a village, a market town and the way etc. They in fact did ask such questions. This shows that their knowledge is evidently limited just like that of a average or worldly man (puthujjana//p.rthagjana).[74] 

The Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahaasaccakasutta)[75] mentions about the imperfection of the six heretics. Here in this Sutta, Saccaka, the son of Jains, disproved their perfection[76] revealing that they shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and evinced anger and ill-will and discontent when taken in hand speech by speech by him. He admires the Buddha because he found him the contrary: "But while the Gotama [the Buddha] was being spoken to thus so mockingly and was being assailed by accusing ways of speech, his colour was clear and countenance happy like that of a perfected one, a fully Self-awakened one."[77] This shows that the Buddha is really of unique perfection, which is unparalleled by the six heretical teachers. 

In the Sandaka Sutta [78] of the Majjhima Nikaaya, the doctrines of the first four heretics are called amoralism (abrahmacariya), for they among with the other two heretics maintaining more or less the theory of no moral causation (akiriyavaada). Their doctrines are altogether rejected as wrong theories (micchaadi.t.thi), their thought as wrong thought (micchaasa"nkappa) and their speech as wrong speech (micchaavaacaa). According to the Buddha, the profounders of akiriyavaada are to reject three ways of moral conducts (sucarita), namely, moral bodily conduct (kaaya-sucarita), moral conduct in speech (vacii-sucarita) and moral conduct in mentality (mano-sucarita). This rejecting of moral action and its consequences logically entails the attitude of being engaged and enjoyed in threefold evil conduct (duccarita), which is the basis of degeneration of human ethics. In other words, those who fail to see the principle of moral causation (kiriyavaada) will surely maintain that there is no action (karma), non-causation of things (ahetuvaada), no the world beyond (para loka). Such theorizers as well as their followers would be blamed in this very life (idha loka) and after passing away from this world they will go to a state of suffering (duggati).[79] As the case being the doctrines of the six heretics were criticized by the Buddhists as lacking of the principle of righteousness (kusala-dhamma). These were rejected as unworthy to be followed and therefore one should avoid to devotion and practice as soon as possible.[80] 

IV. Conclusion 

Denouncing all Indian ethical theories preceding and contemporary with him, the Buddha adopted and introduced a middle standpoint for his epistemology and ethics known as the theory of dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada//pratiitayasamupaada). With this new morally middle doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m deseti), the Buddha rejects all kinds of extremist theories, such as permanent existence and nihilistic non-existence, strict determinism, past-determination, theistic determination as well as non-causation-and-non-conditionality, as follows: 

1. The extremes of existence and non-existence or being and non-being. The former is the theory admitting that everything exists (sabbaa atthii ti), while the later advocating that nothing actually exists (sabbaa natthii ti ).[81] 

2. The extremes of eternalism (sassatavaada) and annihilationalism (ucchedavaada).[82] If eternalism admits that one and the same person both performs actions and experiences the results, then annihilation admits that one performs actions, another experiences the results. 

3. The extremes of past-determination (sabbaa pubbekatahetuvaada) or theistic determination (sabba issaranimmaanavaada) and non-causation-and-non-conditionality (sabaa ahetu-apaccaya-vaada).[83] The first advocate that all human experience, suffering or happiness are determined either by actions performed from the previous lives, or by an almighty God, whereas the last admitting all phenomena and human experience are happened without causes and conditions. 

4. The extremes of attakaaravaada, the belief that ‘pleasure and pain brought about by one’s self, and parakaaravaada, the belief that ‘pleasure and pain brought about by another.’[84] 

5. The extremes of Kaarakavedakaadi-ekattavaada and Kaarakavedakaadi-naanattavaada. The former is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are the same, whereas the latter is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are different.[85]  If the Braahmanical teachings of the Vedas and Upani.sads represent a theistic theory of ethics, the Sramanic thinkers like Puura.na Kassapa, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccaayana, Makkhali Gosaala, Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta and Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta etc., represent some form of amoralism (e.g. nihilistic materialism, non-causationalism and determinism), the Buddha’s teachings (dhamma) are positive assertions of a rational-psychological moralism, which is socially and universally acceptable. 

---

Abbreviations and References 

1. Texts 
A. = A"nguttara-Nikaaya, I-V, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1885-1900) 

BU. = B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad 

ChU. = Chaandogya Upani.sad 

D. = Diighanikaaya, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E. Carpenter, (London: PTS, 1889-1910) 

DA. = Diighanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E. Carpenter, W. Stede. (London: PTS, 1886-1932) 

Dhp. = Dhammapada, ed. K. R. Norman and O. von Hinuber. (London: PTS, 1931) 

DhpA. = Dhammapada A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. H. Smith, H. C. Norman, L. S. Tailang. (London: PTS, 1906-15) 

Dhs. = Dhammasa"nga.nii, ed. E. Muller. (London: PTS, 1885) 

EB. = Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, I-V, ed. G. P. Malalasekera. (Ceylon: 1945-1994) 

It. = Itivuttaka, ed. E. Windisch. (London: PTS, 1890) 

Khp. = Khuddakapaa.tha, ed. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1931) 

KU. = Ka.tæ ha Upani.sad 

M. = Majjhimanikaaya, I-IV, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1888-1902) 

MA. = Majjhimanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi, I. B. Horner. (London: PTS, 1922-38) 

MaU. = Maa.n.dukya Upani.sad 

MuU. = Mu.n.daka Upani.sad 

PTS. = Pali Text Society 

.RV. = .Rgveda 

S. = Sa"myuttanikaaya, I-V, ed. L. Feer and Mrs. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1884-1898) 

Sn.= Suttanipaata, ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith. (London: PTS, 1913) 

'SvetU. = 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad. 

Thig. = Theriigaathaa, ed. R. Pischel. (London: PTS, 1883) 

Ud. = Udaana, ed. P. Steinthal. (London: PTS, 1885) 

Vbh. = Vibha"nga, ed. and tr. by S. K. Mukhopadhyaya. (Santiniketan: 1950) 

Vin. = Vinayapi.taka, I-V, ed. H. Oldenberg. (London: PTS, 1879-83) 

Vism. = Visuddhdimagga, ed. H. C. Warren and D. Kosambi. HOS.41. (1950) 

 

2. Studies

Barua, Benimadhab. (1998) A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1921. 

Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1989) The Discourse on Fruits of Recluseship, the S ma–– aphala Sutta and Its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. 

Kalupahana, David J. (1975) Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. 

Kalupahana, David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1992. 

Kalupahana, David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1992. 

Sinha, Jadunath. (1999). Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Pilgrims Book Pvt. Ltd, 1st Ed. 1963. 

---

NOTES 

[1] KU. i. 3, 11-2; 1, 2, 12&24; MuU. ii. 1, 5-7; 2, 3-5; BU. ii, 4. 10. Cf. BU. iv. 4, 22; ChU. iii, 24, 2; viii. 1, 5; 7, 1; iii. 14, 2; KU. i. 2, 13; ii. 3, 17; 2, 18; MuU. ii. 2, 7, 10-12; iii. 1, 5; 1, 6-9; 2, 11-13. 

[2] Literally means "hearing" in Sanskrit. This is so-called because it was not written down but transmitted orally from the teacher to his followers. 

[3] D. I. 238ff. Cf. M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360. 

[4] M. II. 164 

[5] M. II. 84. 

[6] M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360. These five grounds also recur at S. II. 115, IV. 138; KS. II. 82; IV. 88. Cf. A. I. 190, II. 191. 

[7] KU. i. 2. 21; ChU. vi. 1, 14. 

[8] ChU. vi. 2. 1; 'SvetU. iii, 9; BU. ii. 4, 14; iv, 4, 19; KU. ii. 1, 11. 

[9] KU. i. 2, 14-20; ii. 1, 5, 12-3; MaU. i, 1, 7; MuU. iii. 1, 7; BU. ii. 5, 9; iii, 8, 8; iv. 4, 15-6. 

[10] KU. i. 2, 14; 'SvetU. vi. 9. 

[11] KU. i. 2, 18. 

[12] This unique law of dependent origination or causal uprising (paticcasamuppaada) was discovered by the Buddha on his attainment of perfect enlightenment. Ud. 1-2. 

[13] S. II. 27f, 64f, 95; KS. II. 23, 45, 66: imasmii sati idaa hoti, imassupaada idam uppajjati; imasmii asati idaa na hoti, imassa nirodhaa idaa nirujjhati. Vide also M. III. 63; MLS. III. 107, and Ud. 2. 

[14] This view is examined at M. II. 214; MLS. III. 3ff. 

[15] Cf. A. I. 173ff; GS. I. 157ff. 

[16] Dhaatu-dhammatthitataa = sbhaava-tthitataa, ‘that which, as cause, establishes elements as effects’. Quoted from GS. I. 264, note 3. 

[17] Dhamma-niyaamataa ‘that which, as cause, invariably fixes things in our minds, as effects’. Cf. S. II. 25; KS. II. 21, where a further term is added, idappaccayata, ‘the relation of this to that’. Quoted from GS. I. 264. n. 4. 

[18] The meaning of sankhaara can differ according to contexts. In the context of the five aggregates of existence (khandha), sankhaara tends to mean bad thoughts that a person harbors, and so its sense is psychological; but in the context of the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhana), sankhaara tends to mean all phenomena or compounded things, be they physical or psychological; in other words the whole of the five aggregates of existence. 

[19] Also see in Dhp.: Sabbe sankhaara aniccati (277); Sabbe sankhaara dukkhaati (278); Sabbe dhamma anattaati (279). 

[20] MuU. ii. 2, 11; iii. 1, 1-2; 2, 1; KU. i. 2, 18; 3, 3-4, 9-10; ii. 2, 13; 'SvetU. i. 9-10, 12; iii. 19; ChU. iv. 15, 4; BU. iv. 4, 22; ii. 5, 15. For detailed treatment of the Upanisadic aatman, see for example Sinha (1999): 31-7. 

[21] S. III, p. 50. 

[22] S. III. 67; KS. III 59f. Also see M. III. 329. 

[23] S. V. 430; KS. V. 365. 

[24] A. IV. 137; GS. IV. 92: Just as a mountain river, winding here and there, swiftly flowing, taking all along with it, never for a moment or for an instant or for a second pauses, but rushes of, swirls along and sweeps forward; even so, braahman, like a mountain river is the life of man, insignificant, trifling, fraught with ill and trouble… For the born there is no immortality. 

[25] A. I. 152; GS. I. 135: "Monks, there are these three condition-marks of that which is conditioned. What three? Its genesis is apparent, its passing away is apparent, its changeability while it persists is apparent. These are the three condition-marks…" 

[26] EB. III. 328b. 

[27] Sn. 600-611; M. II. 196ff. 

[28] M. II. 148ff; D. I. 80ff; III. 80ff. 

[29] Sn. p. 23. Reference is from EB. V. 116b. 

[30] D. III. 81-2; DB. III. 78-9. 

[31] Detailed account of these practices is repeatedly found at D. I. 165ff; III. 6-7, 37ff; A. I. 294; II. 207; M. I. 77ff., 238ff., 342, 387, 524. 

[32] M. I. 240ff: This is considered as another extreme of practice vs. self-indulgence (kaamasukhallikaanuyoga). 

[33] Thig. 240-1. 

[34] S. I. 38. 

[35] On Braama.nas’ sacrifices, see M. I. 343-44; S. I. 75; A. IV. 41; D. I. 127, 141. 

[36] Tachibana (1986): 39. 

[37] Tachibana (1986): 40-1. 

[38] For example at S. I. 76; A. II. 42; IV. 151; It. 21; Sn. 303 etc. 

[39] For meaning of these sacrifices, see KS. I. 102, n. 1. 

[40] D. I. 144ff; DB. I. 182ff. 

[41] For their content, see DB. I. 174, nn. 3-4. 

[42] In Buddhism there are also thirteen ascetic practices (dhuta"nga). These are not considered by the Buddha as the path leading to liberation but rather an alternative preparation to the path. For a full account see EB. II. 168. Cf. M. III. 39-42; DhpA. I. 141; Vism. ch. ii.). 

[43] M. I. 387ff; D. III. 6-7. 

[44] D. III. 44-5. 

[45] S. IV. 338. 

[46] M. I. 388. 

[47] D. III. 232. 

[48] S. I. 38. 

[49] See, for instance, at D. I. 56ff; M. I. 517ff; M. II. 2-4; S. I. 69ff. Sometimes only two heretics are mentioned, for example, at A. IV. 47 only Puura.na and Niga,n.tha are dealt with for comparison. 

[50] See, for example, at S. III. 211; A. III. 383. 

[51] For instance, at M. I. 513-524; S. III. 207, 211. 

[52] For instance, at S. IV. 398: Ajata is confused with other heretics; at A. I. 286: Ajata with Makkhali; at A. III. 383: Makkhali with Pakudha and Puura.na. For further evidence to support this, see E. Thomas (1997): 130f., Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7 n.2; and KS. III. 17- n.2 

[53] E.g. M. I. 407, 515-17; S. III. 208, 210. 

[54] For example, at M. I. 515ff, Ananda is said to have analysed and then refuted the teachings of the heretics, whose names are not mentioned. 

[55] D. I. 51-59. 

[56] Cp. Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7. 

[57] Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 9. 

[58] On two kinds of Materialism, see Kalupahana (1975): 26-32; Kalupahana (1994): 13-4. 

[59] D. I. 55. 

[60] D. I. 56. 

[61] D. I. 53. 

[62] M. I. 81-2. 

[63] A. I. 173. 

[64] Kalupahana (1975): 53. 

[65] For account on Mahaaviira’s epistemology, see B. M. Barua (1998): 400-4; Kalupahana (1994): 17-9. 

[66] SuutrakÙ taa"nga I. 1.2.4. 

[67] A. I. 173. For scrutiny of this point, see Kalupahana (1994): 19f. 

[68] M. II. 222. 

[69] S. V. 421. 

[70] D. I. 58. 

[71] EB. IV. s.v. doubt: 667a. 

[72] M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199. Cf. M. I. 92-3; A. I. 220. 

[73] Their claims of this attainment can be found at many palaces in the Tripi.taka, see for instance, at A. I. 220-1; A. IV. 428; M. I. 482, 519; M. II. 31, 519-20. 

[74] M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199. 

[75] M. I. 250-1; MLS. I. 305. 

[76] Including the Jaina leader Niga.n.t.tha Naathaputta. 

[77] Tr. by Horner, MLS. I. 305. 

[78] M. I. 513. 

[79] A. I. 33 says "When doctrine and discipline are wrongly expounded he who strives energetically live a miserable lives." Tr. by F. L. Woodward, GS. I. 30. 

[80] M. I. 519. Apart from the criticism levelled against the six heretics, this Sutta also rejects the traditionalist and the rationalist. M. I. 520f. 

[81] S. II. 17; KS. II. 13. Also see in S. III. 134f; KS . III. 114; and S. II. 76; KS. II. 52. 

[82] S. II. 20; KS. II. 16. 

[83] A. I. 173. 

[84] S. II. 22f; KS. II. 18f. 

[85] S. II. 75; KS. II. 52.