- HINDUISM IN BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE
- by Dr. V.A.Gunasekara
There has sometimes been a tendency, particularly in the Western world, to confuse
Buddhism with Hinduism, a confusion that has not always been confined to the ill-informed
and the ignorant. This stems in part from the historical accident that the Buddha was born
and lived his whole life in India, a country which today has come to be identified almost
exclusively with Hinduism. The habit of many students of religion in the West of lumping
all "Eastern Religions" (by which term is often meant only Hinduism and
Buddhism) into one category, for the purpose of comparison with the Judeo-Christianity of
the West, has tended to perpetuate this confusion,. It forgets that unlike Hinduism, which
in a sense has been an ethnic religion, Buddh ism was a universal doctrine from its
inception and cannot be confined to a particular nation or geographical locale. Then there
is the tendency of some modern "enlightened" Hindus to look upon the Buddha's
teaching as reducing ultimately to one or the other of the doctrines contained in the
Vedas, the Upanishads, or the classic systems of Hindu philosophy (the dharshanas),
not to mention the misguided attempt by their forebears to transform the Buddha into an
"avatar" of Vishnu. In these circumstances it is useful to examine the
fundamentals of Hinduism and Buddhism in order to demonstrate their basic incompatibility,
despite the sharing of a common terminology (itself a source of confusion). A couple of
preliminary issues will have to be considered first. One is a purely terminological
question, viz. the appropriateness of the term "Hinduism" to cover all the
changing phases of India's traditional religion; and the other a chronological one, viz.
to relate the emergence of the main doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism to each other in a
purely historical way.
The word Hinduism was coined by the Muslim scholar Alberuni in the 11th century C.E.
and while its appropriateness to describe the dominant system of religious belief in the
India of his time (and of ours) is unquestionable, its use to describe the oldest
religious beliefs in India (some scholars even applying the term to describe the pre-Aryan
civilization represented by the Harappan culture), is clearly suspect. In this respect the
practice of the earlier scholars to use the term "brahmanism" to designate the
system which prevailed amongst the Aryan invaders before the Buddha's time, and to confine
the word "Hinduism" to designate the system which was synthesised in the
Bhagavadgîta, a work compiled centuries after the Buddha, which became the foundation of
almost the whole of later Hinduism, could be commended. This terminology will be used here
as far as possible, except that the word "Hinduism" will sometimes have to be
used to designate the combined systems of Brahmanism and Hinduism proper, the actual
context hopefully making clear what usage is meant.
The question of chronology has usually been considered a difficult one. Hany students
of Hinduism after proclaiming the impossibility of ascribing dates to early Brahmanical
works, then not only proceed to do so, but give them very ancient ones with little or no
justification. This is true not only of Hindu traditionalists, but also of many Western
orientalists, who in the words of Nirud C. Chauduri "have succumbed to Hindu
chronological fantasies" [Hinduism (1979), p.33]. It may be mentioned that the
antiquity claimed for the Hindu texts contrasts strongly with the lateness of all extant
epigraphcial, iconographical and archelogical evidence. In contrast to this morass of
uncertainty the dates of the Buddha (563 - 483 BCE) have been established with little or
no error. In fact the Buddha is perhaps the first truly historical figure to emerge in
India, just as the Buddhist remains are the earliest religious archeological evidence
unearthed. And the earliest Buddhist literature contain abundant information on the rival
systems of belief prevalent in the India of that time. These references cover both the
main Brahmanical religion based on the Vedas, and the emerging dissentient views
proclaimed by the new sramana philosopher-teachers of the time (the
"gymnosophists" of the later Greek observers of the Indian scene).
The Brahmanical literature to which there is clear reference in the Buddhist literature
are the "Three Vedas", and the Brahmanas based on these three sa.mhitas (the
latter only insofar as the practices recommended by them are castigated). The three Vedas
are, of course, the Rig, the Sâma, and the Yagur. The absence of any references to the
fourth Veda (the Artharva) is an indication that this was not then known as an independent
one. This is borne out by an inspection of this Veda which shows that it is quite
different to the other three, being closer to the Upanishads in some parts, and to a more
primitive magic and sorcery in others. It is therefore a polygot compilation of later
times.
It is now generally recognized that the religion of the Vedas with its deification of
the forces of nature, its constantly professed awe at the basic human functions of breath
and speech, its blending of sacrifice, ritual and magic, its confounding of states of
intoxication (produced by imbibing the Soma libation) with states of mysticism, and so on,
relate to a very primitive stage in the development of the religious consciousness (and
scientific knowledge) of man. The so-called "Vedic wisdom" exhibited is of a
very rudimentary kind, and explicable more in anthropological terms rather than in
metaphysical or philosophical ones. Likewise its "eternal truths" are no more
than the simple hypotheses inspired by the general ignorance of the times. It is also
well-known that the characteristic doctrines of later Hinduism (like the soul-theory,
re-incarnation, karman, moksha, devotion to some concrete manifestation of an omnipotent
Godhead, etc) are either totally absent or present in a very rudimentary form. While the
beginnings of the caste system are traceable it had not yet assumed the rigid religious
form of the later Dharmashastras. Yet the Vedas contained the potential for all these
developments.
By the Buddha's time this potential had already manifested itself, e.g. in the growth
of a greedy priestly caste, and the extravagance of the sacrificial ceremonies
(particularly the ashvamedha with its cruelty and sexual connotations, and even human
sacrifice). It was the Buddha who showed that these were not accidental outgrowths, but
were a consequence of the basic Vedic outlook itself. The Vedic seers thought that they
could answer questions relating to the nature of the human condition, and proceeded to do
so in terms of the conventional ignorance of the times, on which was established a whole
system of religious practice and social conduct.
It is however not to the Vedas and the Brahmanas that the modern exponents of Hinduism
turn to as repositories of "Vedic" knowledge, but to the Upanishads. It was on
the basis of these treatises that elaborate systems of "Vedantist" philosophy
came to be constructed later by philosophers like Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhva; but this
was after the 9th Century CE, long after Buddhism had vanished from Indian soil.
It is therefore the doctrines in the original Upanishads and their
relationship to the Dhamma that must concern us. Once again the chronological problem
assumes some importance. The Indian philosopher Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan [1]
(who can be considered as the typical representative, indeed the leading spokesman, of the
"enlightened" Hindu approach to Buddhism) has claimed that "the Buddha's
teaching is derived from the Upanishads". This presumes that not only were the
doctrines of the Upanishads well known in the Buddha's day, but that the Buddha's system
is actually contained in them. The first is highly conjectural; the second is definitely
false.
There are over. a hundred Upanishads in existence. and of these about a dozen could be
traced to pre-Christian times. Some of these contain references to the Buddha's doctrines
and to the Sangha (e.g. Maithri Upanishad 7.7 - 7.10); others are attached to the later
Artharva Veda (e.g. the Mundaka and the Pra.sna); so all these are post-Buddhist. In fact
only a very few, if any, can claim to be pre-Buddhist, but these include the most original
of the Upanishads, like the B.rihadâranyaka, the Chândogya, and the Taittirîya The
absence of any direct and explicit reference to any of them in the Buddhist texts may mean
that they were not known as such. We know that the Upanishads were treated as esoteric
knowledge given out in forest fastnesses to selected students who were urged to treat this
knowledge as highly secret. But even if particular Upanishads were not known, the general
ideas behind them were. The Buddha's refutation of some of these (e.g. the âtman
doctrine) is evidence that some Upanishadic doctrines were then known, even if not the
actual documents as we have them today. If they did have any influence on the Buddha it
was purely in a negative way, by providing examples of the "false views" which
it was the task of the Dhamma to refute.
Most of Upanishadic doctrine is a restatement of Vedic lore, and
constitutes in Monier William's words "a labyrinth of mystical ideas and puerile
conceit", and these need not concern us here. Only in three distinct areas could any
definite progress be discerned over the earlier Vedic documents. These were: (a) the
theory of the Brahman as an impersonal principle of the absolute; (b) the elaboration of
the âtman-doctrine, and (c) the doctrine of karman, reincarnation and sa.msâra. Of these
the last mentioned has been dealt with elsewhere.[2] So we shall deal
with only the other two here.
"Brahman" constitutes the ultimate reality in the "higher" view of
the Upanishads. It is never explained in any rationally comprehensible way. In the short
Taittirîya Upanishad, to the question "Declare Brahman, sir" the seer answers
as follows: "That, verily, whence beings here are born, that by which when born they
live, that into which on deceasing they enter"; then it is further identified with
food, breath, mind, understanding and bliss (3.1 - 3.8). The very use of a neuter
impersonal term to designate "Brahman" constitutes an advance over the concept
of Brahmâ who was always conceived as a supreme personal creator-god (Ishvara). If
properly interpreted and developed this Brahman-concept could even lead to a non-theistic
world-view. There is little evidence that this was the interpretation favoured by the
original Upanishadic seers, and it was certainly not the way in which it was subsequently
developed. In the conventional usage it becomes a methphysical substitute for the
"unknown"; in reality a repository for ignorance and nescience.
Now the use of undefined concepts is not necessarily wrong; the basic axioms of many
logical systems are based on intuitive concepts that defy precise definition. The Buddhist
concept of Nibbâna is also essentially undefinable. But specific notions about it are not
necessary for the practice of the Buddha's way and the elimination of suffering, as these
are based on empirically verifiable laws,. Infact a sceptical attitude to Nibbâna is not
necessarily incompatible with the Dhamma. The. same is not the case with the
Brahman-concept, which in the last analysis has to be equated to the divine principle, and
becomes a form of theism even if it is a non-personal and non-anthropomorphic theism.
Without such a specific interpretation of "Brahman" there cannot be a rationale
for the Brahmanical and Hindu modes of conduct and way of life. Such activity cannot be
grounded on an undefinable and non-cognizable "something".
It is well-known that there are no references to the impersonal Brahman in the Buddha's
discourses. None of the Buddha's interlocuters seem to have raised this question, a
further proof that to the minds of the age there was hardly any difference between Brahman
and Brahmâ. Brahman as an undefined and undefinable concept may be immune to logical
criticism, but at the same time it cannot provide the basis for a meaningful ontology. If
the Brahman-concept escapes the Buddha's direct critique it is because of this very
characteristic that it could not provide a consistent alternative world-view in its pure
form. The Buddha would have included it amongst the systems of sophistry (or
"eel-wriggling") described in the Brahmajâla Suttanta as amarâvikkhepikâ. In
its concrete form this Upanishadic doctrine reduces, to something quite different, and
this is, of course, consistently criticised by the Buddha.
The Atman ("soul") was conceived by the Upanishadic seers as the personal
subjective counterpart of the impersonal objective Brahman. The older Vedic theory had
identified it more closely with the functioning of the human person, and this view too
continues to prevail in the Upans shads; but it is the identification with the Brahman
that was the unique contribution of the Upanishads. Now it was this
"non-dualist" view that was propagated by Samkara as "advaitya", but
it remained a minority view and was not compatible with the strictly devotional forms of
Hinduism. The identification of the Atman with the Brahman was seen by the monists as the
"elevation of the human to the devine", but it could equally be looked upon as
the "degradation" of God to the human level; indeed it could be interpreted in a
way similar to the Buddhist view of God as the creation of the human mind. It was because
of these implications that the orthodox devotional Hindus charged that Sankara had
absorbed Buddhist views (whereas he is well known as the persecutor of Buddhists in
medieval India).
The Upanishads had the potentiality to break away from the theistic mold of thinking;
and had this happened the Upanishadic seer's fervent plea, "Lead me from darkness to
light", may have been partly fulfilled. All that happened was a retreat to a
conventional theism. This retreat is clearly seen in the Bhagavadgîta, which established
the pattern of Hinduism which has survived to this day. Here the theistic pantheon is
re-established, but now interpreted as the manifestations of an all-powerful deity in its
various aspects. Some of the cruder excesses of the sacrificial system are eliminated or
transmuted into symbolic form. The âtman is again seen as the indestructible essence of
man, originating with God and seeking final union with its creator. Dharma becomes the
divinely ordained system of (caste) duty. The ideas of karman and reincarnation were
fitted into this mould.
The clearest differences between Hinduism and Buddhism can be seen by comparing the
Hindu path with that of the Buddha. Since the Bhagavadgita three valid methods of
salvation have come to be recognized in Hinduism. These are: bhaktiyoga (the way of
faith), Karmayoga (the way of action), and Jńânayoga (the way of knowledge). These may
be compared to the three components of the Buddha's path: pańńâ (wisdom), sîla
(morality) and bhâvanâ (mental development).
Bhaktiyoga and pańńâ stand in stark contrast to each other. The former is an appeal
to divine grace by completely eliminating all human potentiality for independent thinkmg
and the evaluation of moral action; pańńâ is the attempt to understand the human
predicament by individual effort and to see reality "as it truly is". Bhakti is
nescience and resignation; pańńâ is (scientific) investigation and purposive action
based on it. The difference between karmayoga and sîla is that the former is ritualistic
action and the performance of duty simply because it is so ordained in an authoritative
source; sîla is the accomplishment of moral acts (by word, deed, or thought) on the
empirical ground that it is condusive to the good of oneself and others. The five great
sins according to the code of Manu (the most authoritative of the Hindu law books) are:
killing of a brahmin (i.e. a member of the priestly caste), stealing gold from one,
adultery with the wife of a religious teacher, association with one guilty of these four
rules, and the partaking of liquor. These may be compared with the pańca-sîla of
Buddhism. (It is interesting that nowhere in Hinduism is there an outright condemnation of
murder as generally wrong, in contrast to the numerous taboos relating to the partaking of
various kinds of food). Jńânayoga might give the impression that it is concerned with
the pursuit of knowledge. In fact the "knowledge" that is meant here is that of
God and of the undefined concepts of the Upanishads; this is the very antithesis of what
is meant by "knowing" in the scientific-rationalist sense. In Buddhism, however,
pańńâ can include the acquisition of discursive scientific knowledge even though some
exponents of the Dhamma deny it. The third component of the Buddha's path is meditation,
which is simply mental and psychological development, and has nothing to do with reaching
"mystical" states of mind which is the object of Hindu meditation. A word may be
said about the Darshanas, because of the claim that Buddhism is derived from some of them.
This involves claiming for them an antiquity which they do not possess. Furthermore, of
the six classic systems, the Mimamsâ, the Yoga, and the Vedanta are too theistic to
warrant any consideration; the Nyâya and the Vaisheshika too concerned with logic and
taxonomy, and only the sa.mkya has seriously been considered as having any affinity with
Buddhism. But even here the similarity has been exaggerated, and any influence would have
been from rather than to Buddhism.
Buddhism deals with the three laws of anicca (impermanence), dukkha
(unsatisfactoriness) and anatta ("no soul"), but of these it is only the last
which is really the essence or bedrock of the Dhamma. By contrast the single unique
doctrine common to all forms of Hinduism is that of âtman or "soul" asserted by
even the most atheistic and monist of Hindus. Now the incompatibility between these two
doctrines goes beyond the fact that they are linguistically opposites of one another. They
imply different world-views and different kinds of human action. Those who seek to
minimise the distance between Buddhism and Hinduism assert that in his anatta doctrine the
Buddha only referred to the "selfishness" of people, which they referred to as
the "small ego" in contrast to the "Grand Ego" (which is equated to
the âtman). Thus when Radhakrishnan states that the Buddha was "silent about the
soul" (Indian Philosophy, I, p.385) he interprets all the references to atta
(soul) in the Pali Cannon as referring to this "small ego".
Even Mahâyâna Buddhism which has some similarities with Hinduism, is also basically
incomaptible with it because its doctrine of sunyâta has no counterpart in Hinduism.
Some common ground is shared between Hinduism and Buddhism, and these
seperate them from the monotheisms of the Middle East. These include the notion that each
person should seek his/her salvation independent of socially organized authorities like
"established churches", that tolerance is an essential ingredient in the search
for spiritual truth, that forced or induced "conversion" is invalid, and so on,
not to mention specific views in the areas of cosmology and the like. But these should not
blind us to the fundamental differences that seperate them.
NOTES
- Radhakrishnan's interpretation of Buddhism could be gleaned from his
Indian Philosophy (1923) and the 1938 Annual Lecture on a Naster Hind entitled
"Gautama Buddha", given to the British Academy. His later writings do not
contain any progress from the views expressed in these works. It must be mentioned that
Radhakrishnan treats the Buddha with respect and fairness, and was particularly impressed
by the moral quality of Buddhism. But he stuck to the Hindu interpretation of Buddhism
throughout.
Return to Text
- See the present writer's article "Pre-existence, re-incarnation
and rebirth" in BSQ Newsletter Old Series No.3, reprinted in the Young
Buddhist (Singapore) for 1983.
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