- Are there Seventeen Mahaayaana Ethics?
- David W. Chappell
- University of Hawaii at Manoa
The Need to Study Mahaayaana Ethics
Numerous Western studies have been published on Buddhist ethics for early Buddhism and
contemporary Theravaada, but surprizingly little exists for Mahaayaana ethics.[1] This is perplexing not only because Mahaayaana Buddhists
are more numerous than Theravaadins, but also because Mahaayaana rhetoric claims that,
unlike the more conservative (“little vehicle”) Buddhists, they
postpone their own nirvana in order to remain behind in the world out of compassion to
help other living beings. But one must ask: if Mahaayaana Buddhism is so dominated by the
rhetoric of compassion, why are the primary examples of contemporary Buddhist social
activism largely found in Theravaadin countries, and most studies of ethics based on early
Buddhism and Theravaada? Certainly Mahaayaana scriptures abound with lofty ethical visions
and universal goals that should inspire Western writings on Mahaayaana ethics.
There seem to be at least six reasons for the lack of Western studies on Mahaayaana
Buddhist ethics: (1) most of the 200 Indian Mahaayaana ethical texts that exist are found
only in Chinese and have not been translated; (2) the complexity, diversity, and vastness
of these 200 Indian Mahaayaana ethical texts has made a comprehensive study difficult;[2] (3) the Indian Mahaayaana sponsorship of ascetic and
meditative powers produced idealistic ethical visions often unrelated to social practices;[3] (4) since strong Confucian-style governments in East Asia
made social involvement by Buddhist clergy largely illegal, ethical guidelines on social
issues beyond the monastic precepts were irrelevant;[4] (5)
until recent times, new East Asian lay Mahaayaana movements have largely adopted Confucian
ethics or emulated the clergy; and (6) East Asian Buddhism often lacked sustained
collaboration across sectarian and cultural boundaries, so that no institutional
instrument existed (like the Vatican) to discuss and formulate common Mahaayaana ethical
principles.
In spite of these obstacles, there are a number of reasons why the topic of Mahaayaana
ethics is of great urgency today. Certainly one is the perplexity of Western Buddhist
practitioners who see the contradictions between the teachings of early Buddhism (now
readily available in English) and the Confucian institutional patterns of the East Asian
Mahaayaana lineages that they join (especially Zen). Another reason is the long-standing
challenge of Christian social welfare programs in East Asia that makes Mahaayaana Buddhism
look passive and unconcerned about social problems. A third reason is the increased social
involvement of East Asian Buddhists as they explore their new freedom from government
restrictions, which were removed after 1945 when many East Asian governments emulated the
separation-of-church-and-state policy of the American constitution. (Of course, the
notable exception to this liberalizing trend is the People's Republic of China.) As a
consequence, there has been a rise of Buddhist social welfare programs in the Mahaayaana
Buddhist countries of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, and international meetings on Buddhist
social welfare are now being scheduled.[5]
The Scope of Mahaayaana Ethics
Damien Keown's excellent book on The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (1992) provides a
helpful introduction to Mahaayaana ethics by analyzing the Mahaayaana six perfections,[6] followed by an outline of the threefold ethical structure
of Mahaayaana (restraining evil, cultivating virtue, and helping others), and illustrated
by a translation of the 52 rules in the Bodhisattvabhuumi-suutra. His analysis is
particularly helpful in exposing the tension between right action and saving wisdom, and
the confusion caused by two different levels of skillful means (upaaya): one which
emphasizes strict obedience to institutionalized precepts by ordinary Buddhists, and the
other kind of skillful means used by Buddhas and great bodhisattvas that transcends the
precepts and is mythic in nature. While Keown's presentation provides some Mahaayaana
materials for his larger analysis of the nature of ethical decision making in Buddhism, it
is based largely on monastic materials and clearly shows that it is not designed for
society as a whole. Moreover, even though he begins his analysis by acknowledging that
Mahaayaana ethics is complex, with a variety of developments that are occasionally
contradictory, because he relies largely on the Bodhisattvabhuumi-suutra, the full
range and complexity of Mahaayaana is not shown. Other treatments of Mahaayaana ethics in
the West have also been limited to selected sources.[7]
In contrast to limited Western studies of Mahaayaana ethics, in Japan, forty years ago,
Ono Hoodoo presented a comprehensive study of bodhisattva precepts in which he identified
86 titles of works on Mahaayaana precepts found in the ten historical catalogs of Chinese
Buddhist texts. Since some of the different titles are for the same work, and many are
lost, Ono found that only 32 titles survive in our existing canonical collections.[8] In addition, Ono also found 168 other Mahaayaana scriptures
that have moral and ethical principles, which brought the total of bodhisattva precept
texts to 200.
Ono's foundational book is a major bibliographical achievement and makes available to
us the basic sources for the study of Mahaayaana ethics. In order to correct the neglect
of Mahaayaana ethics, there is no better place to start than to review these 200 sources
identified by Ono in search of the ethical principles that they contain.
Charles Prebish has recently observed that many treatments of Buddhist ethics actually
review only the lists of rules and do not explore the ethical principles that lie behind
the precepts.[9] This means that our task is not just to
accumulate and compare the set of moral rules found in each of these 200 texts. Instead,
an adequate discussion of Mahaayaana ethics reguires interpreting the various lists of
moral regulations found in these 200 texts in the light of the dominant worldview, values,
and practices represented in each text. Even when two texts share the same rules, this
need not imply a common ethic unless their underlying principles also are in agreement.
Accordingly, a distinction must be made between a list of moral rules and the framework of
interpretation that provides their meaning and that guides practitioners in handling
conflicting values (such as the value of remaining pure by not handling money in contrast
to the value of easing the suffering of others by buying medicines).
Frameworks for Mahaayaana Ethics?
The task of analyzing the lists of rules and quasi-rules from these 200 texts becomes
even more staggering if each list must be placed within its framework of understanding and
practice before it can be adequately compared. A promising reduction of this task is made
by Ono who proposes that many of these texts can be grouped together into seventeen
textual families since many texts have common associations or a common history. For
example, he identified thirteen Perfection of Wisdom texts, nine texts connected
with the Lotus group, fourteen texts in the Nirvaa.na-suutra group, and so forth. These
groupings imply that the texts in each group share not only a common history, but also are
connected in their ideas, values, and practices, and may have originated in a common
Buddhist community or tradition. (See the Appendix for the list of textual groups
made by Ono.)
At this initial stage of investigation, however, it is important not to misrepresent
the role of these seventeen textual groups as if they represented seventeen different
forms of Mahaayaana ethics. Accordingly, the concern of this paper is to reflect on these
seventeen groups, since they are not equally cohesive or matched.
While common associations attract texts into most of the seventeen groups, in Group No.
14, Ono lists twenty-one texts as independent and unrelated. Furthermore, in Group No. 16,
Ono lists twenty-eight texts which share the common function of repentance, but which may
involve very different world views and values, as with the “independent
scriptures” group. Based on their different perspectives, these repentance texts
may also involve very different ethical views of right and wrong actions, as well as
different understandings and practices for recovering from wrong.[10]
Another problem arises in Group No. 15, where Ono places sixteen different texts
dealing with the five, eight, or ten lay precepts and the ten good deeds. Ono acknowledges
that almost half of these lay precept texts can also be found in Hiinayaana vinaya
collections (Nos. 1476, 1478, 1471, 1472, 1474, 1475, and 1473). If these texts are so
neutral or so elementary that they can serve Hiinayaana as well as Mahaayaana communities,
does this mean that they lack a distinctively Mahaayaana ethic? If they lack a distinctive
ethic, does this mean that they should not constitute a separate group but can be combined
with other textual groups? Or does it imply that they should not be used at all as a
source for Mahaayaana ethics since they do not clarify what is distinctive about
Mahaayaana ethics?
Ono identifies eleven bodhisattva precept texts (Group No. 17), but separates two
bodhisattva precept texts (the Brahmaa-net suutra and the Mahaayaana
Contemplation suutra on the Mind-stages of Previous Lives) into a separate group
(Group No. 10). Although the worldview, values, and practices of these latter two texts in
Group No. 10 overlap with many of the texts in Group No. 17, the textual history is very
different, since the two texts in Group No. 10 were probably compiled not in India but in
China, and share other common features.[11] Accordingly,
in spite of their different textual histories, Groups Nos. 10 and No. 17 will probably
have a great deal of overlap in terms of their ethical positions.
These five groups (the Independent Scriptures Group, Lay Precept Group, Repentance
Group, and Bodhisattva Precept Texts-namely, Groups Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 10) contain
78 texts, while the other 122 texts are placed in twelve groups that seem more coherent,
since they are focused around major Mahaayaana suutras, with the implication that the
texts within each group share common worldviews, values, and practices.
Even among these major suutra groups, however, there are some with boundaries
that are unclear. For example, Ono utilizes an anthology of Mahaayaana scriptures called
the Mahaaratnakuuta-suutra (Great Treasury collection) and creates a
distinctive textual group using its title and including five texts from the collection
that have ethical content (Nos. 13, 36, 38, 47, and 48).[12] To
this core, Ono adds other translations of these selected texts (Taishoo Nos. 342,
341, 345, 397 [11], 311 and 353) and two other related texts (Taishoo Nos. 316 and
346). For these texts, Ono and the compiler of the Great Treasury collection
are in agreement on shared principles. However, Ono then selects eight other texts
from the Great Treasury collection and finds that they fit better in five other
groups that he has devised, namely:
v No. 5 is placed in Group No. 6 on Pure Land Ethics
v Nos. 9 and 26 in Group No. 15 on Lay Precepts
v No. 19 in Group No. 8 on Aagama Ethics
v Nos. 23, 43 and 44 in Group No. 2 on Mahaakaa"syapa Ethics [13]
v No. 34 in Group No. 3 on Vimalakiirti Ethics
Although the Pure Land text (No. 5) and the Lay Precept texts (Nos. 9 and 26) have
special topics, the compiler of the Great Treasury collection felt that they did
not contradict the values and worldview of his/her community, but were precious treasures.
Since the Pure Land text has a focus on another world, and the lay precept texts focus on
elementary practice, they could easily be reconciled within a larger Mahaayaana framework
of practice. This may also be true of the other five texts, and it calls into question
Ono's groupings as a basis for discussing separate ethical frameworks.
Ono also develops a textual group related to another great anthology of scriptures, the
Mahaasamnipaata-suutra (the Great Assembly collection). However, there is
one text in this collection (No. 11) that also exists as No. 47 in the Mahaaratnakuuta-suutra
(the Great Treasury collection). In this case, Ono places this text not in the Great
Assembly group, but with the Great Treasury collection.[14]
Obviously, the criteria used by the compilers of these collections were not shared by
Ono, since he groups the texts in different ways. Just as the distinctive textual
traditions of the Pure Land and Lay Precept group did not imply a separate
ethical framework, the same may be true for the other texts that are placed in the Aagama,
Mahaakaa"syapa, and Vimalakiirti groups. Obviously the compilers of the
Great Treasury collection accepted all these texts as teaching a common message and
set of values. Accordingly, the overlap of Groups Nos. 2, 3, 6, 8, 12, and No. 15 based on
their shared presence together in the Great Treasury collection suggests that the
boundaries between these different groups devised by Ono may not be ethically decisive.
It is clear that the first nine suutra collections focused on the Perfection
of Wisdom, Mahaakaa"syapa, Vimalakiirti, Lotus, Hua-yen,
Pure Land, Bodhisattvabhuumi, Aagama, and Nirvaa.na-suutras
represent a different kind of text from Ono's last three groups dealing with repentance,
bodhisattva precepts, and lay precepts, since the former are more thematic, while the
latter serve a ritual function. Accordingly, any one Buddhist community could use
texts from several groups while still maintaining internal ethical consistency. For
example, in East Asia the Brahmaa-net suutra was used by most Buddists as their
bodhisattva precept text, while at the same time they focused on one or another major suutra
as primary, such as the Lotus or Pure Land texts. Since a single community
could focus on one of the suutra collections as primary, and at the same time also
identify with one bodhisattva precept text and one repentance text, an ethical system
might be shared across several of Ono's textual families.
In summary, even if most of Ono's textual groups reflect distinctive textual traditions
and probably separate communities, it does not mean that they also had distinctive and
competing moral systems. They could still share the same monastic and lay moral rules, as
well as a similar set of ethical priorities and interpretive frameworks. Beyond
identifying distinctive textual traditions and functions, primary consideration should be
given to distinguishing the different internal Buddhist ethical frameworks.
Diversity of Ethical Frameworks
Compassion has been seen as a central value within Mahaayaana. However, in Buddhist
history compassion has been interpreted in a variety of different frameworks that have
been carefully distinguished. The most common appearance of compassion in early Buddhism
was the practice of universal compassion as part of the four immeasurable minds. [15] However, this ethic was given a very different meaning
when practiced by the brahmins in contrast to the disciples of the Buddha.
In early Buddhist texts it is not uncommon for the Buddha to recommend the four
immeasurable minds to brahmins to practice. In one instance (Pali Middle Length Sayings
No. 99), instead of the values that the brahmins had been using (truthfulness,
austerities, chastity, study, and renunciation) as a means for communion with the god
Brahmaa, the Buddha recommended universal compassion as part of the four immeasurable
minds. [16] As a consequece, these minds are often
called the four brahmavihaaras (si-fan-zhu), the “ways of living
like Brahmaa.” In another discourse (Pali Middle Length Sayings No. 97),
Saariputta taught the Brahmin Dhaana~njaani how to have companionship with Brahmaa by
practicing the four minds. Even though the Buddha assures the monks that Dhaana~njaani was
reborn in the Brahmaa world, [17] he is also careful
to point out that there is still farther to go on the path.
This warning, that the immeasurable minds might provide companionship with Brahmaa but
were still incomplete and subject to rebirth, is repeated in a number of other discourses.[18] For example, this same distinction occurs in The
Great Steward Mahaagovinda Sutta of the Pali Long Discourses (No. 19) where we
read that even though the four immeasurable minds lead to union with the gods in the
Brahmaa realms, they do not lead to liberation:
[the four immeasurable minds do] not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to
cessation, to peace, to super-knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbaana, but only to birth
in the Brahmaa-world, whereas my holy life leads unfailingly to disenchantment, to
dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to super-knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbaana.
That is the Noble Eightfold Path. . . [19]
As Harvey Aronson explains, when an ordinary person cultivates the four immeasurable
minds, “he is reborn in the Brahmaa worlds after his death, but after the
expiration of his lifetime there, he is reborn as a hell being, hungry ghost, or animal
(A.ii.129).[20] By contrast, disciples of the Buddha will
be reborn in the Brahmaa worlds after death, but will continue to practice until they
experience final release and gain nirvaa.na. Even though practicing compassion as a part
of the four immeasurable minds plays a positive role in early Buddhism, it is the larger
framework of understanding and insight that determines its ultimate significance for the
destiny of the practitioner.
Based on their different social obligations (caste) and goals (companionship with
Brahmaa), the compassion practiced by the brahmins probably led to different social
decisions and had different qualities from the compassion practiced by the Buddha's
disciples, who were caste-free. In other words, these different frameworks of
understanding involved different relationships and values that will affect the substance
and tone of practice to the degree that they can be considered different ethics. Both
advocate compassion, but the quality and expressions of compassion differ.
Parallel to this twofold distinction is a similar discussion in the Mahaayaana Perfection
of Wisdom tradition between a limited compassion and an unlimited version, but it is
the compassion of the Two Vehicles which is seen as finite, whereas it is the Mahaayaana
compassion that is unlimited. In the case of the Perfection of Wisdom literature,
the difference is based on whether one is attached to the notion of other beings or not:
Wise Bodhisattvas, coursing thus, reflect on non-production,
And yet, while doing so, engender in themselves the great
compassion,
Which is, however, free from any notion of a being.
Thereby they practice wisdom, the highest perfection.
But when the notion of suffering and beings leads them to
think:
'Suffering I shall remove, the weal of the world I shall work!'
Beings are then imagined, a self is imagined,
—The practice of wisdom, the highest perfection is lacking. [21]
When he has got rid of the notion of I and the notion of other
beings,
Established in the perfection of morality is that Bodhisattva
called.
If a Bodhisattva, coursing in the path of the Jinas,
Makes [a difference between] these beings as observers of
morality and those as of bad morality,
Intent on the perception of multiplicity, he is perfectly
immoral. He is faulty in his morality, not perfectly pure in it. [22]
These early Perfection of Wisdom texts supplant the normal moral distinctions
with new distinctions between those attached to the notion of separate beings and those
free from such notions. True and saving morality is based on being free of the notion of
separate beings. Because all reality was seen as conjured like a magical illusion,
bodhisattvas are able to practice what is called “great compassion”
that involves different ethical options than available to the Two Vehicles:
This is the manifestation of the great compassion that a Bodhisattva, who
courses on the pilgrimage of a Bodhisattva, thinks that “for the sake of the
weal of every single being will I roast in the hells for aeons countless as the sands of
the Ganges, until that being has been established in the Buddha-cognition” [23]
This quotation shows that the normal space-time limits for expressing compassion were
removed by the Perfection of Wisdom tradition. Also, based on the same removal of
distinctions, the lines marking the violations of precepts in Mahaayaana were also
sometimes removed. Instead, wrong actions that break the rules can be reinterpreted in a
context of good intent that sometimes condones them as expedient and helpful actions based
on “great compassion” (compassion in the light of the wisdom of
emptiness) as seen in such texts at the Upaaya-suutra and the Vimalakiirtinirde"sa-
suutra.
These two levels of practice seem to parallel the two levels of skillful methods of
practicing the precepts discussed by Keown above. Even though the second way is described
with Mahaayaana hyperbole (language which Keown referred to as mythic), it does imply that
there are different attitudes, perspectives, and different values involved in the
Mahaayaana practice that were meant to shape and tone ethical decisions and behavior at
the highest level. As a consequence, we can see that the same value (compassion) can
function in different soteriological contexts that result in different expressions.
Certainly, in these examples, the more mundane or conventional approach (whether it is by
brahmins or by the Two Vehicles) is used as a foil for the higher method of practicing
compassion that leads to liberation.
All Mahaayaana must be seen in the light of the doctrine of emptiness that transforms
the normal distinctions between morality and immorality at the primary level of
soteriology, and it is fitting that Ono placed Perfection of Wisdom as the first
group of texts. This new vision of compassionate action, which transcends the normal
boundaries of space-time and right-and-wrong, became part of the shared mythic imagery of
Mahaayaana. The first nine suutra groups devised by Ono share to one degree or
another in this new exhuberance and differ mostly in their imagery and emphasis: namely,
the Perfection of Wisdom, Mahaakaa"syapa, Vimalakiirti, Lotus,
Hua-yen, Pure Land, Bodhisattvabhuumi, Aagama, and Nirvaa.na-suutras.
Whichever textual group is chosen as primary, a major practical question still involves
the ethical decisions by practitioners about how to live in our conventional world and
what they reconsider to be their primary ethical responsibilities in the light of
emptiness. As a basis for discussion and future analysis, I would offer four major ethical
frameworks:
1. A continuation of early Buddhist monastic ethics that emphasizes nonattachment from
worldly concerns expressed as the ethics of avoidance of wrong and the cultivation of
kindly attitudes in retreat from the world as the best way to actualize the equalizing
insight of emptiness;
2. The primacy of compassion by laity as superior to monastic withdrawal, since only
the laity can use both the dharma, and very practical, material methods of removing the
suffering of all beings based on a bodhisattva sense of affinity with them;
3. A balance between the monastic personal ethic of restraint and an awareness of the
emptiness of emptiness that requires walking the middle path, embracing both emptiness and
the provisional world, to exercise compassion toward all beings by actions inside and
outside the monastery;
4. Contemplative monasticism that emphasizes the primacy of the mind based on insight
into the interpenetration and emptiness of all reality, which enables the awakened mind to
manifest illusory forms throughout the universe to bring about the transformation and
salvation of others in the midst of a world that is equally illusory.
Four Mahaayaana Ethical Frameworks
All of these four ethical frameworks--retreat, social involvement, balance, and
meditative trance--are based on the Perfection of Wisdom insights and the practice
of the six perfections. The first is largely the continuation of traditional monastic
Buddhist priorities with the addition of a Mahaayaana metaphysics and supplemental
practices. For example, even though based on the insight into emptiness, the soteriology
of practitioners who use the Pure Land family of texts often lessens their urgency
about saving other beings in the present, since they also feel in need of the
compassionate power of Amitaabha to save themselves as well as others. This reaches its
extreme interpretation in Japanese Jodooshinshuu practitioners, who do not emphasize any
ethical practice, in contrast to Chinese Pure Land practitioners, who were more inclined
to attempt to fulfill the traditional moral injunctions.
The second option is found in new lay Mahaayaana groups, as represented by such texts
as the Upaasaka Precept Scripture, and makes a clear break from traditional
Buddhism. It criticizes the compassion of recluses as limited to teaching the dharma,
whereas the compassion of laity is able to meet the practical needs of others by giving
help to the sick, food to the hungry, and shelter to the homeless.[24]
The ethics of balance encompassing both the secular and the monastic, both the mundane
and mystical, is perhaps represented by the Nirvaa.na-suutra. This text echoes the Perfection
of Wisdom distinction when it teaches that the compassion of the four immeasurable
minds can be practiced either in terms of causal relations, which are limited and subject
to rebirth, as done by the Two Vehicles, or in terms of the limitless and inconceivable,
which is the way of the bodhisattva. (Taishoo 12.695b-700c) This did not mean a
denial of the status of ordinary life, nor its primacy, but the profound unity and
infinity of sacred and secular life. To some degree this involves a mystical perception
that embraces all life and affirms the affinity between oneself and all reality. How this
was worked out in detail is not clear. One option was the ethics presented in China by
Tiantai Zhiyi (538-597),[25] but its legacy in the
“formless precepts” of Chan and the “sudden and complete
precepts” of Japanese Tendai raises more questions than answers, and the Four
Great Bodhisattva Vows of Zhiyi are perhaps its most positive contribution.
The fourth ethic of meditative action is very common in Mahaayaana, whose ideals are
lofty and inspiring, but usually remain in the mind and cannot be practiced with the body;
they are found inside the monastic walls, but cannot be related to conflicts in the
street; they are generated and nurtured on the meditation cushion, but are difficult to
apply in the complexities of human relationships. One of the best examples of this
Mahaayaana tendency toward abstract, interior idealism is the Avata.msaka-suutra
(Ch. Huayan jing; Jp. Kegonkyoo),[26] which
is a compendium of several smaller scriptures. Even when this monumental text was the
stimulus for a Buddhist doctrinal school (best represented by Fa-tsang), it was never
limited to only one group, but was revered as foundational for all East Asian Mahaayaana.
Certainly, in China, its images have been sculpted into temple walls, its ideas developed
into devotional rituals, and its verses written as decorative slogans and wall-hangings as
a result of constant study for over 1500 years.
The high respect given to this scripture is illustrated in the Tiantai school, where it
is placed first among all the teachings of the Buddha and became identified with the
teaching of the Buddha immediately after he attained enlightenment. However, while
revering its profundity, Tiantai went on to argue that no one could understand the
fullness of the message, so that in the next stage of his teaching career, the Buddha
simplified his message and began to teach the Aagamas for those with less developed
mental and spiritual capacities.[27] This shows the gulf
that was felt between the high ideals of the Avata.msaka and the more concrete
guidelines needed by ordinary humans beings.
Even though the Da"sabhuumika chapters of the Avata.msaka are used
in precept rituals in Tibet, there are many other parts of the Avata.msaka that
seem to abandon ethical behavior in favor of internal meditative experience. This
increasing abstraction and movement from morality to vision is perhaps illustrated in the
following description of the bodhicitta, the mind dedicated to attaining enlightenment, as
found in the Ga.n.davyuuha, the penultimate chapter of the Avata.msaka:
the mind of enlightenment-the mind of great compassion, for the salvation of all
beings; the mind of great kindness, for unity with all beings; the mind of happiness, to
stop the mass of misery of all beings; the altruistic mind, to repulse all that is not
good; the mind of mercy, to protect from all fears; the unobstructed mind, to get rid of
all obstacles; the broad mind, to pervade all universes; the infinite mind, to pervade all
spaces; the undefiled mind, to manifest the vision of all buddhas; the purified mind, to
penetrate all knowledge of past, present, and future; the mind of knowledge, to remove all
obstructive knowledge and enter the ocean of all-knowing knowledge.[28]
The priority given to a sense of the unlimited and cosmic over practical ethical action
is supported by important philosophical assumptions that have been analyzed by Luis
Gomez's study of the Ga.n.davyuuha. He argues that the central doctrine of the text
combines “two notions common to all Buddhists: the notion that all appearance is
illusory and the traditional belief in the psychic powers attained through the exercise of
asceticism.”[29] Although it is common to assert
that Buddhist ethics cannot be fully implemented until enlightened realization that is
facilitated by meditative practice, the Ga.n.davyuuha sometimes seems to equate
meditative realization with ethical achievement.
In his analysis, Gomez shows that the Ga.n.davyuuha emphasizes the notion that
the psychic power of advanced practitioners contains the capacity to produce an image of
reality. Since, according to the Ga.n.davyuuha, our ordinary world merely consists
of illusory images manifested by the dharmadhaatu, then the advanced practitioner
has the power to produce images that are the equivalent of our ordinary world. As a
consequence, all achievement, including ethical achievement, can be accomplished with the
mind alone. As the Ga.n.davyuuha states:
Having understood that the world's true nature is mind, you display bodies of your own
in harmony with the world. Having realised that this world is like a dream, and that all
Buddhas are like mere reflections, that all principles are like an echo, you move
unimpeded in the world. In an instant you show your own body even to [all] the people in
the three times. Yet, in your mind there is no [mental] process of duality and you prach
the Principle in all directions. [30]
Although it is a common Mahaayaana idea that the three worlds (of illusion and rebirth)
are created by the mind, it is not agreed that the real world, seen free of delusion, is
created by the mind. However, the Ga.n.davyuuha equates these two worlds, and
thereby radically transforms the framework for ethics. Even though the monastic rules and
lay precepts of the Ga.n.davyuuha may be shared by other texts, this radical
emphasis on mystical achievement made a major difference in interpreting how the world was
to be saved.
Because of the dominant role played by Confucian-style governments, East Asian
Buddhists have utilized the Indian materials in selective ways. For example, because
Buddhist clergy in East Asia were largely confined to monastic duties and forbidden by law
to be social active in the community, the Ga.n.davyuuha worldview reinforced the
idea that it was not only acceptable but desirable to try to save the world only by
sitting on one's meditation cushion. This is a major topic that is waiting for serious
discussion.
Conclusion
Although Indian Mahaayaana Buddhism ceased to exist almost a thousand years ago, its
legacy survives in East Asia and Tibet in a bewildering collection of Mahaayaana
commentaries and new movements. Accordingly, in order to give a full account of Mahaayaana
ethics, it is important to supplement the 200 Indian Mahaayaana texts identified by Ono
with a review of East Asian texts and practices. This task will involve not just
historical studies of distinctive movements, such as the Chinese Three Stages movement,[31] but also studies of, and with, contemporary groups: the
socially active Japanese Nichiren traditions, or the Buddhist vihaara movement of
Higashi Honganji, or the new practices of the Taiwan Buddhist Tzu-chi Foundation, or
Mahaayaana ethics for Western Buddhists.[32]
While there are some general common characteristics that linked Indian Mahaayaana,
there never existed an institutional or textual unity. Given the broad sweep of so many
texts and movements, and the lack of any institutional integration, it seems premature to
broadly talk about “Mahaayaana ethics.” However, given the foundation
offered by Ono, with more work we should be able at least to see the profile of
“Indian Mahaayaana ethics.” The proposal made by this paper is that
instead of differentiating the ethical frameworks in terms of textual commonalities and
traditions as used by Ono, probably a better device will be to arrange texts in terms of
their primary social behavior and community identity, since these elements are a better
indicator of ethical values than the metaphysics and intergalactic imagery that
proliferates in Mahaayaana texts.
Appendix
Seventeen Textual Families on Indian Mahaayaana Ethics: Based on 200 surviving Chinese
translations (including different translations of the same text) identified by Ono Hoodoo,
Daijoo kaikyoo no kenkyuu (Tokyo:Risoosha, 1954): 45-66.
No. 1. PERFECTION OF WISDOM TEXTS: Nos. 1-13 (13 texts)
No. 2. MAHAAKAA"SAPA TEXTS: Nos. 14-22 (9 texts)
Includes the “Bestowing Wish-granting Gem Scripture” (Taishoo
12.189-194, No. 350, Chinese tr. 179 AD) and two texts with partial English tr. by Chang, Treasury
of Mahaayaana suutras: 280-314, 387-414.
No. 3. VIMALAKIIRTI ETHICS: Nos. 23-35 (13 texts)
No. 4. LOTUS ETHICS: Nos. 36-44 (9 texts)
No. 5. HUA-YEN ETHICS: Nos. 45-56 (12 texts)
No. 6. PURE LAND ETHICS: Nos. 57-62 (6 texts)
No. 7. BODHISATTVA-BHUUMI: Nos. 63-65-3 texts
Taishoo 30: Nos. 1581, 1582, 1583. Sanskrit. tr. by Mark Tatz, Asa"nga's
Chapter on Ethics With the Commentary of Tsong-Kha-Pa, The Basic Path to Awakening, The
Complete Bodhisattva (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1986): 47-89; analysis
by Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992):
129-164 (“Ethics in Mahaayaana”).
No. 8. AAGAMA ETHICS: Nos. 66-72 (7 texts)
Includes Taishoo No. 1488, tr. by Shih Heng-ching, The suutra on Upaasaka
Precepts (Berkeley: Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, 1991), and the suutra on Bodhisattva
Fasting (Taishoo No. 1502).
No. 9. NIRVAA.NA SUUTRA ETHICS: Nos. 73-86 (14 texts)
Taishoo No. 375 tr. by Yamamoto Kosho (1973-1975).
No. 10. BRAHMAA-NET & MIND-STAGES CONTEMPLATION SUUTRA: Nos. 87-88
Two texts possibly compiled in China: Taishoo Nos. 159 & 1484.
No. 11. GREAT ASSEMBLY SUUTRA: Nos. 89-105 (17 texts)
Includes Vaipulya-mahaa-samnipaata-suutra, tr. Dharmak.sema 414-421, plus a new
compilation (Hsin-ho ta-chi-ching) by Sengjiu in 586 AD (Taishoo No. 397).
(a) suutra of Inexhaustible Meaning-67 rules; (b) Treasure Crown suutra-65
rules; (c) A-cha-mo jing-63 rules; (d) Ak.syamatinirde"sa suutra-65
rules (See Jens Braarvig, The Tradition of Imperishability in Buddhist Thought
[Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1993] I.131-138.)
No. 12. GREAT TREASURY SUUTRA: Nos. 106-119 (14 texts)
Based on the Mahaaratnakuuta-suutra (Taishoo 11.195-322) partially tr. in
Garma C.C. Chang, A Treasury of Mahaayaana suutras (1983). Cf. tr. of No. 11 (Taishoo
11.294-315) by Ulrich Pagel, The Bodhisattvapi.taka: Its Doctrines, Practices and Their
Position in Mahaayaana Literature (1995): 327-413; No. 19, Ugraparip.rrcchaa,
tr. by Nancy Schuster, (U of Toronto PhD, 1976); No. 48, "Sriimaalaadevii suutra,
tr. by Diana Paul (1980) & by Alex Wayman (1974).
No. 13. ESOTERIC ETHICS: Nos. 120-124: (5 texts)
No. 14. TWENTY-ONE INDEPENDENT SCRIPTURES: Nos. 125-145 (21 texts)
Unrelated texts, such as the Tun-chen t'o-lo-so wen pao ju-lai sam-mei ching (Taishoo
15.348-367, No. 624) tr. by Lokak.sema (147-186 AD), a core text in 3rd century China.
No. 15. TEN GOOD DEEDS & FIVE, EIGHT, TEN LAY PRECEPTS: Nos. 146-161 (16
texts)
No. 16. REPENTANCE TEXTS: Nos. 162-189 (28 texts)
No. 17. BODHISATTVA PRECEPT TEXTS: Nos. 190-200 (11 texts)
TEXTS NOT SELECTED
Ono lists various Mahaayaana Buddha suutras (Amida, Vairocana, Esoteric, Taishoo
14, No. 449, No. 425, etc.), Bodhisattva suutras, Disciples suutras, Lay suutras,
Women's suutras, Youth suutras, Eight-section suutras, Meditation suutras,
and Wisdom suutras.
Notes
[1]. See Frank Reynolds, “Buddhist Ethics: A Bibliographical
Essay,” Religious Studies Review 5:1 (Jan 1979): 40-48; Donald K.
Swearer,“Nirvana, No-Self, and Comparative Religious Ethics,” Religious
Studies Review 6:4 (Oct 1980): 301-306; Charles Hallisey, “Recent Work on
Buddhist Ethics,” Religious Studies Review 18.4 (Oct 1992): 276-285;
Charles Prebish, “Modern Buddhist Ethics in Asia and America,” The
Pacific World, N.S. 8 (1992): 40-47; and “Text and Tradition in the Study of
Buddhist Ethics,” The Pacific World, N.S., 9 (1993): 49-68. Damien Keown,
The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992): 5 has recently called
attention to the striking neglect of Mahaayaana Buddhist ethics by Western scholars,
although he applauds Roderick Hindery, Comparative Ethics in Hindu and Buddhist
Traditions (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978) and G.S.P. Misra, Development of
Buddhist Ethics (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984) for including chapters on Mahaayaana
in their books. Keown himself helps to make up for the deficiency by an extensive analysis
of “Ethics in the Mahaayaana” (1992: 129-164), and then compares
Mahaayaana ethics to earlier Buddhism and to Western ethical thought. However, if East
Asian Buddhism is also included as Mahaayaana, then the list of works grows somewhat. See,
for example, Christopher Ives, Zen Awakening and Society (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1992); James Heisig and John Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the
Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1994). Return
[2]. See the next section that summarizes the findings of Ono,
Hoodoo, Daijoo kaikyoo no kenkyuu (Tokyo: Risoosha, 1954). Return
[3]. See the critique of the idealistic move in the Avata.msaka
tradition by Luis Gomez, “Selected Verses from the Ga.n.davyuuha: Text,
Critical Apparatus and Translation” (1967 Yale Ph.D. dissertation, University
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan): lxxvi-lxxxv. Return
[4]. This suppression of Buddhist social service by the government
is documented for China by Michihata, Ryooshuu, Daijoo bosatsukai no tenkai (Tokyo:
Shooen, 1985), whose findings are summarized by Whalen Lai in his article
“Chinese Buddhist and Christian Charities: A Comparative History,” Buddhist-Christian
Studies 12 (1992): 5-34. In Korea, Buddhism was severely oppressed and restricted for
the last five centuries during the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910). In Japan during the Tokugawa
period (1600-1867), Buddhism was made an instrument of the state, and only recently has
there been strong Japanese Buddhist critique as expressed by such writings as Shoko
Watanabe, Japanese Buddhism: A Critical Appraisal (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai,
1968). The effort to recover from this government suppression is found in many new
Buddhist movements, and even in efforts to revive the older traditions, for example in
Zen: see Ryomin Akizuki, New Mahaayaana: Buddhism for a Post-Modern World
(Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1990). Return
[5]. Increased communication has greatly facilitated awareness of
the new experiments in Buddhist social activism, and annual international meetings have
been held at the University of Hawaii (1993) and in Taipei (1994) under the sponsorship of
the Torch of Wisdom (FAX: 886-27085054) which offers a bilingual weekly newspaper
highlighting Chinese Buddhist social activism. Return
[6]. The “six perfections” refer to the six
practices or ideals that were the core curriculum for early Mahaayaana Buddhism: namely,
giving, morality, patience, zeal, meditation, and wisdom. For the classic study of these
in English, see Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932): 165-269. Return
[7]. See the translation of the Bodhisattvabhuumi-suutra by
Mark Tatz, Asa"nga's Chapter on Ethics With the Commentary of Tsong-kha-pa, The
Basic Path to Awakening, The Complete Bodhisattva (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellon
Press, 1986); a translation of "Saantideva's Bodhiscaryaavataara by Stephen
Batchelor, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Dharmasala, 1979); Alex
Wayman, Ethics of Tibet: Bodhisattva Section of Tsong-Kha-Pa's Lam Rim Chen Mo
(Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1991), and so forth. Return
[8]. Ono, Hoodoo, Daijoo kaikyoo no kenkyuu (Tokyo:
Risoosha, 1954): 8-44. Return
[9]. See Charles Prebish, “Text and Tradition in the
Study of Buddhist Ethics,” The Pacific World, N.S., 9 (1993): 49-68. Return
[10]. In an earlier paper I identified five different forms of
repentance based on differences of worldviews and purposes. See “Formless
Repentance in Comparative Perspective,” in Fo Kuang Shan Report of
International Conference on Ch'an Buddhism (Tashu, Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Fo Kuang
Publishers, 1990): 251-267. Return
[11]. See Paul Groner, “The Fan-wang ching and
Monastic Discipline in Japanese Tendai: A Study of Annen's Futsuu jubosatsukai kooshaku,”
in Robert Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1990): 251-290; and Busshoo kaisetsu daijiten VII.346c-351c. Return
[12]. Three of these five are partially translated into English by
Garma Chang, ed., A Treasury of Mahaayaana suutras (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983): 41-72, 427-468, and 363-386. The full text of
No. 48 is translated in Wayman (1974). Return
[13]. Texts Nos. 43 and 44 have been partially translated by Garma
Chang, ed., A Treasury of Mahaayaana suutras: 387-414 and 280-314. Return
[14]. The Baoji Pusa Pin of Dafangdeng Dajijing (T 13.
173-184) is also contained in the Great Treasury Collection as No. 47, Questions Asked
by Bodhisattva Baoji Scripture (Baoji Pusa Hui) (Patna-cuda parip.rcchaa)
(T11.657-672; tr. 266-313 AD). Return
[15]. The four immeasurable minds (si-wuliang-xin; Pali cattasso
appama~n~naayo) are good-will (mettaa), compassion (karu.naa),
sympathetic joy (muditaa), and equanimity (upek.saa). For a discussion of
the four immeasurable minds in early Buddhism, see Aronson, Love and Sympathy in
Theravaada Buddhism: 60-77; Gunapala Dharmasiri, Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics
(Antioch, California: Golden Leaves, 1989): 42-52. These are considered immeasurable
because the Buddha gave instructions to fill each direction--north, south, east, west, as
well as up, down, and across--with goodwill (ci), with compassion (bei),
with sympathetic joy, and with equanimity. While practitioners were to extend these
attitudes to all beings everywhere, in various early texts the Buddha implies that there
are different levels for practicing these virtues. The basic practice of the four
immeasurable minds was not restricted to the Buddhist community, but was also taught by
the Buddha to nobles and to brahmins. Return
[16]. Zhong-ahan jing No. 152, T 1.669c4-670a7; I.B. Horner, tr., Middle
Length Sayings (London: Luzac & Company, 1970) 2:396-397; Bhikkhu ~Naa.namoli and
Bhikkhu Bodhi, tr., The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 1995): 808; cf. Mauraice Walshe, tr., Thus Have I Heard: The Long
Discourses of the Buddha (London: Wisdom Publications, 1987), No. 13: 193-195. Return
[17]. Horner, Middle Length Sayings II:377-379; Zhong-ahan
jing No. 27, T 1.458b; ~Naa.namoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses: 791. Return
[18]. The Buddha in the Shorter Discourse at Assapura in
the Pali Middle Length Sayings (No. 40), where he describes two levels of
practicing the four immeasurable minds. If practitioners are from a noble or brahmin
family and develop cattasso appama~n~naayo to attain calm, then they are beginning
to follow the proper practices of a recluse, but still must be reborn. However, if they
are from any family, noble or common, and have attained the uniquely Buddhist step of
achieving the destruction of attachments through wisdom, then they are recluses with the
destruction of cankers, which involves no more rebirth. (Horner, Middle Length Sayings
I: 338; ~Naa.namoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses: 372; Zhong-ahan
jing No. 183, T1.725c) Compare the Pali Middle Length Sayings No. 52, in which
Aananda conveys the teaching of the Buddha to a layman by explaining the first four levels
of meditation, followed by the four immeasurable minds, as training toward final
liberation. After recommending each of the four minds, Aananda then qualifies his
recommendation by warning that these minds are impermanent and must come to an end because
they are caused and thought out. (Horner, Middle Length Sayings II:16; ~Naa.namoli
and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses: 454; Zhong-ahan jing No. 217, T
1.802a, cf. T 1.916.) Aananda's warning is explained by the Buddha in the Shorter
Discourse at Assapura in the Pali Middle Length Sayings (No. 40) where he describes
two levels of practicing the four immeasurable minds. If practitioners are from a noble or
brahmin family and develop cattasso appama~n~naayo to attain calm, then they are
beginning to follow the proper practices of a recluse but still must be reborn. However,
if they are from any family, noble or common, and have attained the uniquely Buddhist step
of achieving the destruction of attachments through wisdom, then they are recluses with
the destruction of cankers which involves no more rebirth. (Horner, Middle Length
Sayings I:338; ~Naa.namoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses: 372; Zhong-ahan
jing No. 183, T 1.725c.). Return
[19]. Mahaagovinda Sutta: The Great Steward of the Long
Discourses (No. 19), Maurice Walshe tr., Thus Have I Heard: 313. I am indebted
to Harvey Aronson, Love and Sympathy: 71 for this reference. Return
[20]. Harvey Aronson, Love and Sympathy: 73. Return
[21]. Edward Conze, tr., The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight
Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary (San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973):
11-12. Return
[22]. Ibid.: 68-69. Return
[23]. The Twenty-five Thousand-line Perfection of Wisdom suutra,
Edward Conze, tr., The Large suutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975): 168. Return
[24]. See Shih, Heng-ching, tr., The suutra on Upaasaka
Precepts (Berkeley: Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, 1991): 17 and 122-124. I have analyzed this
ethic in some detail in Searching for a Mahaayaana Social Ethic,” in Journal
of Religious Ethics (forthcoming). Return
[25]. See my forthcoming article on “Buddhist Compassion
(cibei) and Zhiyi's Moho zhiguan” to appear in a forthcoming
volume celebrating the 1400th anniversary of Zhiyi's death. Return
[26]. The Avata.msaka-suutra has been translated into
English by Thomas Cleary, The Flower Ornament Scripture, 3 vols. (Boulder,
Colorado: Shambhala, 1984-1987); and by Dharma Realm Buddhist University Buddhist Text
Translation Society, Flower Adornment suutra (Talmage, California: 1979-1982), with
commentary by Tripi.taka Master Hua. Return
[27]. This theory that the vast quantity of Buddhist scriptures
can be arranged into five different teaching periods of the Buddha's life was developed by
Zhanran (711-782), and is a revision of the theory that all Buddhist texts can be divided
into “five flavors” taught by Tiantai Zhiyi (538-597). See
“Introduction to the T'ien-t'ai Ssu-chiao-i,” Eastern Buddhist,
N.S., IX.1 (May 1976). Return
[28]. Cleary, Flower Ornament Scripture, 3: 59; BTTS, Flower
Adornment Scripture, Chapter 39, Part II, p. 25; Taishoo 10.335b.2ff. Return
[29]. Luis Gomez, Selected Verses from the Ga.n.dvyuuha: Text,
Critical Apparatus and Translation (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1967; reprinted
by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1968): lxxvi. Return
[30]. Ga.n.davyuuha 302.22-24. Return
[31]. See James B. Hubbard, Salvation in the Final Period of
the Dharma: The Inexhaustible Storehouse of the San-chieh-chiao (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University Microfilm International, 1986): 97-141. Return
[32]. Two important Western contributions to Buddhist ethics are
Robert Aitken, The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics (San Francisco:
North Point Press, 1984), and Rita Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy: A Feminist
History, Analysis, and Reconstruction of Buddhism (Albany, New York: SUNY Press,
1993). Return
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