- "Cutting the Roots of
Virtue:" Tsongkhapa on the Results of Anger
- Daniel Cozort
- Assistant Professor of Religion, Dickinson College
INTRODUCTION
Among the six root afflictive emotions (nyon mongs, kle"sa) identified in
the Buddhist Abhidharma literature as the causes for episodes or entire lifetimes of
suffering, anger (Tibetan: khong khro, Sanskrit: pratigha) holds a singular
place. It is one of a few mental states[1] that not only
establish "seeds" or "roots" of nonvirtue, but also nullify the seeds
or roots of individual virtue planted by exemplary actions such as giving and patience.
Among these states, anger is uniquely destructive. The Ma~nju"sriivikrii.dita
Suutra warns that a single moment of anger can result in a person's loss of a hundred aeons
of virtue.[2] "Saantideva, the ninth century author of
the greatly influential Bodhisattvacaryaavataara multiplies this dire warning
tenfold (chapter 6, verse 1): anger wipes out not just a hundred, but a thousand
aeons of virtue.
Since most people lose their tempers with dismaying frequency, it seems
reasonable to wonder how, from a Buddhist perspective, it is possible simultaneously to
contend that a mere outburst can have such an extraordinarily negative effect and to
assert, as Mahaayaana Buddhists generally do, that all sentient beings will gain merit
sufficient to attain liberation. It appears that apologists for the Mahaayaana tradition
have a heavy burden--they must either interpret statements about anger's effect on the
stores of virtue as gross exaggerations spun out as a matter of "skill in means"
(thabs la mkhas pa, upaaya-kau"salya), delimit the range of persons to whom
they are said to apply, or indicate ways in which anger's effects can be ameliorated.
Tsongkhapa Losang Drakba [3] (tsong kha pa
blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419), founder of the Tibetan Gelukba (dge lugs pa)
order, uses the latter two routes in his extensive analysis of anger. I will examine
portions of his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (completed in 1402) and
his Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakiirti's)
Madhyamakaavataara (1418) where Tsongkhapa meticulously scrutinizes the Indian
sources. In these works he assesses the importance of the status of the recipient of anger
and attempts to explain what precisely it does and does not mean to "cut the
roots" of virtue for the incredible spans indicated in the Indian sources.[4] In the process, he manages to limit significantly the scope
of the Indian sources, explaining that they refer only to anger at bodhisattvas and
that "cutting" the roots of virtue means something far less than
"destroying." However, it is not clear that, in the end, Tsongkhapa has
succeeded in demonstrating that anger does not, at least in some cases, prevent salvation.
QUANTIFYING THE PENALTY FOR ANGER
Although clearly the Buddha regarded anger as a massively destructive force, suutra
sources that quantify its effect are noticeably scarce. Tsongkhapa cites the Upaaliparip.rcchaa
Suutra, the Ma~nju"sriivikrii.dita Suutra, and the Sa~nchayagaathaapraj~naapaaramitaa
Suutra. The Upaaliparip.rcchaa Suutra[5] warns
that there is no greater cause for elimination of the roots of virtue "than when one
spiritual adept (brahmacaarya) abuses another," but it does not specify how
great that loss might be. For that, the locus classicus appears to be the
aforementioned Ma~nju"sriivikrii.dita Suutra which warns that one may lose a
hundred aeons of virtue in a moment of anger. Candrakiirti (7th cent.), the Maadhyamaka
interpreter through whom Tsongkhapa views nearly all important matters of Buddhist
doctrine, possibly basing his estimate on this source, also states that anger destroys a
hundred aeons of virtue (Madhyamakaavataara 3.33):
Therefore, anger toward a Conqueror Child
Destroys the virtue arisen from giving and ethical discipline,
Accumulated over a hundred aeons, in a moment.
Candrakiirti clarifies the suutra by indicating that hundred-aeon anger is directed at
a "Conqueror Child," or bodhisattva--a person who, for Tsongkhapa, has an
aspiration to Buddhahood both altruistic and spontaneous (but who is not necessarily
someone who has amassed significant amounts of merit or wisdom). This, of course, greatly
reduces the probable instances of hundred-aeon anger by an ordinary person. Tsongkhapa
also cites "Saantideva,[6] who without specifying the
recipient of anger, says (Bodhisattvacaryaavataara 6.1):
Whatever good deeds [you have done],
Collected over a thousand aeons,
Such as giving and homage to the Ones Gone Thus
Are destroyed in one [moment of] anger.
Aware that Candrakiirti has specified that the recipient of hundred- aeon anger is a
bodhisattva, he surmises that the recipient of the thousand-aeon anger mentioned by
"Saantideva must also be a bodhisattva and, moreover, that the angry person must be a
non- bodhisattva.[7] If this is what "Saantideva
meant, we might suppose that a thousand-aeon penalty would be a rather rare occurrence.
Given a bodhisattva's generally benign behavior, presumably a bodhisattva would rarely
commit acts that would spur the wrath of others.[8]
Continuing with this line of reasoning, Tsongkhapa concludes that if the supreme
penalty for anger involves a non-bodhisattva's anger with a bodhisattva, then
Candrakiirti's reference to a lesser penalty that also involves anger with a bodhisattva
can only mean that one bodhisattva is angry with another. It is surprising to learn that
bodhisattvas ever get angry, since they are, for Tsongkhapa, persons always able to rouse
their bodhicitta, the altruistic aspiration to Buddhahood. However, although bodhicitta
can arise spontaneously, it is not continuously present in non-buddhas, and at least some
bodhisattvas are susceptible to anger for nearly all of a period of
"uncountable" aeons. This is the length of the paths of "accumulation"
(tshogs lam, sa.mbhaaramaarga) and "preparation" (sbyor lam,
prayogamaarga), the first two of the five paths concluding in Buddhahood.[9] Anger is not precluded until one is well into the path of
preparation, the second part of which is called "peak" (rtse mo, muurdhan)
because it is the end of the period in which one can generate anger that will sever the
roots of virtue. At least one contemporary scholar says that a bodhisattva may become
angry even after that point, but the anger is weaker than the anger to which the
quotations refer and will not sever the roots of virtue.[10]
Tsongkhapa is very specific about the consequences of being an angry bodhisattva. A
mature bodhisattva who is angered by one who is lesser[11] loses
a hundred aeons of virtue; on the other hand, a bodhisattva angry with a greater one loses
an aeon of virtue for each instant of the anger's duration. In the latter case, Tsongkhapa
has a source in the Sa~nchayagaathaapraj~naapaaramitaa Suutra, which states:[12]
If a bodhisattva who has not been prophesied
Angers and disputes with another who has so been,
He must bear the armor from the beginning for as many
Aeons as the times his mind was imbued with hatred.
Tsongkhapa interprets this to mean that a bodhisattva's anger with one who has received
the prophesy of Buddhahood from a Buddha will impede the former's progress for many aeons.
For example, someone about to progress from the path of accumulation to the path of
preparation would be set back for as many aeons as there were instants of anger.
Presumably the number of instants would swiftly rise above one hundred, since anger has
more serious consequences for lower persons than high ones and otherwise the greater
bodhisattva would pay a higher price than a lesser.
However rare or common angry bodhisattvas might be, they incur lesser
"penalties" for anger than do the rest of us. A bodhisattva's anger with a
non-bodhisattva would entail a penalty far less than a hundred aeons. Tsongkhapa
explicitly asserts that "Only a bodhisattva is an object of anger that destroys roots
of virtue accumulated over a hundred or a thousand aeons." [13]
According to Tsongkhapa, it does not matter whether one knows as a bodhisattva the
person with whom one is angry. This is unexpected. Tibetan discussions of karma virtually
always classify correct identification of the recipient of an action as a primary
consideration in the determination of a specific act's weightiness. It is of lesser
consequence, for instance, to shoot a gun at a coiled rope in the corner of a darkened
room that one believes mistakenly to be a snake than to shoot at an actual snake. However,
perhaps Tsongkhapa would answer that even if one does not realize that the person at whom
one is angry is an actual bodhisattva, one certainly would have had experience of that
person's compassion; one therefore would have correctly identified the fundamental
character of the person even if one did not realize that the person merited the title
"bodhisattva." If so, it would support the view of the contemporary Gelukba
scholar, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso[14] , who contends that
anger toward anyone who has shown one great kindness is a source of "limitless
destruction of merit." To become angry even at an equal, he continues, may cost roots
of virtue collected over many lifetimes. To speculate, perhaps this is because anger mixed
with ingratitude contributes to pride and other kle"sas. This modern
interpretation seems consonant with the thrust of the Indian sources.
Whoever is the recipient of one's anger, clearly anger is considered an immensely
negative force. We would not be surprised to learn that anger could result in rebirth in a
hell for thousands of years or that it might give one who had an otherwise fortunate birth
an ugly countenance. But anger is far worse. What makes anger different from most other
nonvirtues is that it not only contributes to the store of causes for miserable future
experiences but also affects the store of causes for fortunate experiences.
CUTTING VIRTUE'S ROOTS
Tsongkhapa calls the principal effect of anger "cutting" the "roots of
virtue" (dge rtsa, ku"sulamuula).[15] Ways
to cultivate and "plant" roots of virtue were a major concern in early Buddhism,
as Robert Buswell has recently shown.[16] For instance,
roots of virtue are a major topic in the Abhidharmamahaavibhaa.saa (second cent.),
the document from which comes the name of the Vaibhaa.sika school that, according to
Tibetan doxographers, is one of the two principal Hiinayaana systems. Subsequent
theoreticians of karma retained the horticultural metaphor but switched to the image of
"seeds" rather than roots; Tsongkhapa treats "roots" and
"seeds" as synonymous terms. Both refer to the establishment in an individual
continuum of a potential for future effects. Both virtuous intentional actions and
nonvirtuous intentional actions infuse an individual continuum with potentials. The nature
of these potentials --are they physical? mental? neither?--has long been debated in
Buddhist scholasticism.
Again, the Indian texts seem to warn clearly and unambiguously that even a moment
of anger can wipe out the virtue one has accumulated over the course of aeons. What else
might it mean to "destroy" (bcom) virtue "from the roots?" When
a plant's roots are cut, it usually dies. Alternately, when its seeds are destroyed it can
no longer bear fruit. However, some plants, such as the sweet potato, do not die when
their roots are cut; they lie dormant until the conditions exist for their regeneration,
or they slowly produce new root systems. Tsongkhapa, it seems, considers virtue to be a
sweet potato. He explains that when anger "cuts" virtue's "roots," it
is not destroyed, although aeons will roll on before it again becomes capable of producing
the sweet fruit of a pleasant rebirth. Therefore, "destruction of the roots of
virtue" (dge pa'i rtsa la bcom pa) is not equivalent to "totally cutting
the roots of virtue" (dge pa'i rtsa ba kun tu chad pa,
samucchinnaku"salamuula) which for some early Buddhists meant a permanent
disbarment from liberation.[17]
This is the picture that emerges from Tsongkhapa's reflections in the
"Patience" chapter of his Lam rim chen mo. It arises as he addresses
himself to certain unnamed scholars, apparently[18] the
followers of Bud"on (bu ston, 1290-1364), the prolific scholar of the Sagya (sa
skya) sect whose influential works were still reverberating when Tsongkhapa began his
Buddhist studies. He affirms Bud"on's basic interpretation: despite the presence in
the Indian sources of apparently unambiguous language such as "destruction" or
"elimination," the "seeds" (sa bon, biija) established by
virtuous actions are certainly not destroyed by negative emotions such as anger; they are
merely incapacitated. They cannot be destroyed by anger because only
wisdom--consciousnesses at the level of the path of seeing (mthong lam,
dar"sanamaarga) and above--can eliminate karmic seeds. That is, until one has
experienced emptiness (stong pa nyid, "suunyataa) mystically--without any
dualities, without conceptuality--liberation from any sort of karma and its results is
impossible. Hence, the language of the Indian texts is not literal, but must be
interpreted in the following way: because the seeds of virtue cannot reach fruition, for
the angry person it is as though the roots of virtue were destroyed.
Although it is not a question Tsongkhapa addresses explicitly, we can see that by
interpreting "cutting" as something less than destruction, Tibetan exegetes seek
to avoid a serious challenge to the Mahaayaana doctrine of universal salvation (namely,
that all sentient beings will eventually reach Buddhahood). If anger can be so potent, and
as we know too well ourselves, occur so frequently, then certainly how could they ever
have fortunate rebirths in which to make progress toward Buddhahood? Asa"nga (fourth
cent.), in his Abhidharmasamuccaya, asks just this question.[19] He makes a distinction between "roots" and "seeds"
of virtue and nonvirtue such that it might be possible for someone to have lost roots but
not seeds and therefore retain the possibility of future regeneration of the roots of
virtue. However, he contends that there are some among those whose roots of virtue are
eradicated who also have no seeds of virtue and therefore have no "dharma of parinirvaa.na."
They make sa.msaara truly endless, for they themselves will never escape it. Tsongkhapa
makes no distinction like Asa"nga's between "roots" and "seeds"
and does not admit the possibility that some are doomed to endless sa.msaara. He appears
to think that since the roots of virtue can be regenerated, and since, moreover (as we
will see below), their period of dormancy can be abbreviated by the application of proper
antidotes to the poison that has deadened them, no such result need be entailed. As I
state later, it is not clear that his explanation succeeds.
Although Tsongkhapa agrees with Bud"on and his followers that the roots of
virtue continue to exist despite anger, he disagrees with them over whether this will
entail adverse consequences. The problem, they think, with asserting that virtue might
still exist despite having been "cut" is that it might then seem to follow that
if certain precise conditions were to occur, virtue's seeds might yet sprout; therefore,
anger would not actually have had a deleterious effect on virtue. For example, if virtue
continued to exist, could not a wayward monk whose temper too often bested him somehow
still experience the effects of past virtue? Tsongkhapa's response falls under several
heads.
SEEDS CAN EXIST WITHOUT RIPENING
In the first place, Tsongkhapa wishes to establish that karmic seeds can exist
without ripening even in the presence of conditions that ordinarily would cause them to
"sprout." He relies on Bhaavaviveka's (sixth cent.) Madhyamakah.rdayav.rttitarkajvaalaa
to assert that, for example, even an "ordinary" person (one who has not had the
mystical experience of emptiness) can use the "four opponent powers"--remorse,
restraint, the cultivation of specific "antidotes," and cultivating bodhicitta[20] -- to suppress the issuance of the effects of nonvirtue.
One might regret a harsh utterance, pledge not to repeat the behavior, cultivate
loving-kindness, and so forth. Just as anger cannot destroy the seeds of virtue, so the
four powers do not destroy the seeds of non-virtue, but they do prevent their
unpleasant effects from being issued.[21] This suppression
of the maturation of negative karmic seeds is commonly called "purification,"
which one might incorrectly assume entailed complete destruction or elimination, but as we
have seen can mean only temporary incapacitation.
Another of Tsongkhapa's examples involves a far more advanced person who has
attained the path of preparation, that level at which, according to Tsongkhapa, there has
been an inferential understanding of emptiness.[22] For
such a person, the attainment of a higher path consciousness ensures that even the
presence of what ordinarily would be proper ripening conditions will still not lead to the
maturation of those seeds of non-virtue that could ripen as wrong views (log lta,
mithyaa.d.r.s.ti) or birth in the miserable realms of animals, hungry ghosts, and
hell-beings. As in the previous instance, although the seeds cannot yet be destroyed, they
can be incapacitated.
Indeed, all "heavy" karma, the sort that results in particularly
fortunate or miserable birth, suppresses the issuance of effects that are contrary to it.
For instance, a hell-being never experiences pleasure, nor does a god experience pain
(until, after vast stretches of time, his or her birth-impelling karma approaches
exhaustion). Therefore, in Buddhist cosmology, the incapacitation of seeds of nonvirtue or
virtue is a common occurrence.[23]
Tsongkhapa's final example is not as obvious as the others. Among seeds that exist
without ripening are those that have already ripened, yet continue to exist.
Commenting (in Illumination) on a passage in the Ak.sayamatinirde"sa Suutra
that compares virtue to a drop of water placed in the ocean, remaining as long as the
ocean endures, Tsongkhapa says,[24] "Virtuous roots
are not consumed through the emergence of their effects; however, it is not the case that
anger does not consume them." In Great Exposition he says, "Even with
regard to virtuous and nonvirtuous actions that have ceased upon issuing their own
maturation, there has not been an elimination of their seeds."[25] In brief, he says that actions can cause effects without being
"used up."
How could "ripened seeds" continue to have any kind of existence? We
must recall that seeds established by virtue (or nonvirtue) cannot be destroyed by
anything other than wisdom of the path of seeing or above; therefore, they are not
destroyed even if their effects have already issued forth. This point is, perhaps,
counter-intuitive: once a seed has produced its effect, what sense can be made of saying
that it continues to exist? It is as though one were to say that despite the fact that a
seed had developed into a tree, the seed continued to exist (although it could not, of
course, produce yet another tree). I think, however, that Tsongkhapa's point is
considerably more subtle. He expands upon it in Illumination, commenting on
Candrakiirti's statement in Madhyaamakaavataara (6.33) that:
Because a sprout is not [inherently][26] other than its
seed,
At the time of a sprout, the seed has not been destroyed.
However, because they are not the same
It is not said that at the time of a sprout its seed exists.
Tsongkhapa comments:[27]
In the [non-Praasa"ngika] systems, they think: "When a thing such as a sprout
has disintegrated, everything that is part of the sprout is obliterated." Since one
does not get any other thing that is different from a sprout, such as a pot, they assert
that disintegratedness (zhig pa) is utterly not a thing. In the [Praasa"ngika]
system, for example, one cannot designate (1) Upagupta's individual five aggregates (phung
bo, skandha), (2) their collection, or (3) that which is a different entity from those
two as an illustration of Upagupta, and Upagupta is also unsuitable to be an illustration
of those three. However, it is not contradictory that despite that, what is designated as
Upagupta in dependence on his aggregates is a thing. Similarly, even though
disintegratedness also cannot be an illustration of either the thing (dngos po, bhaava)
that has been destroyed or anything that is the same type as that, it is a thing because
it is produced in dependence on a thing that has been destroyed.
In Tsongkhapa's view, karmic "seeds" are neither physical presences nor even
mental phenomena that persist over time. Then, what are they? They are
"disintegratednesses" (zhig pa, na.s.ta--there is no graceful English
term). Because all impermanent phenomena disintegrate moment-by-moment, when an action
disintegrates, its state of having disintegrated--its disintegratedness--arises. It
too, disintegrates, giving rise to the "disintegratedness of the
disintegratedness" of the action, and so on, until a fruition occurs. Hence,
"seed" really refers to the present moment of "disintegratedness" of
an original action. Asserting that "disintegratedness" is a functioning entity
but denying that it is substantially existent allows Tsongkhapa to avoid either the
absurdity of saying that karma persists unchanged or of proposing a substantially existent
entity like the Vaibhaa.sika "acquisition" (thob, praapti) to account for
the continuing link between a mind-stream and a karma.[28]
Based on his understanding of Praasa"ngika philosophy, Tsongkhapa describes all
phenomena as mere imputations designated in dependence on certain bases. In his example, a
man named Upagupta is not identical with the body and mind in dependence on which
"Upagupta" is designated. This is Upagupta's mode of existence because he is
empty of inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhaavasiddhi).
Nevertheless, Upagupta exists. Similarly, says Tsongkhapa, the
"disintegratedness" of a virtuous action exists upon the action's
disintegration. Although there is nothing to which one can point that is the
"disintegratedness" (just as there was nothing to which one could point which
was Upagupta), nevertheless there is a basis--the disintegrated action--in dependence on
which "disintegratedness" can be designated (just as there is a basis--a body
and mind--in dependence on which "Upagupta" can be designated).
The consequence of this is that Tsongkhapa feels that it is possible to assert
that even when an actions's fruition has been experienced, the action's disintegratedness,
which functions as its "seed," does not cease. Of course, how could
"disintegratedness" ever cease to exist? Once something has disintegrated, it
will always be true that it has disintegrated. Thus, there is no way that anger could
destroy the seeds of virtuous actions.[29] (It may also be
that this manner of explaining the persistence of virtue's "seeds" even when
virtue has been "ripened" has to do with denying that the accumulation of merit
is a "zero-sum game." That is, although virtue might ripen in fortunate
rebirths, it continues to "count" toward the store of merit that comprises half
-- the other half being the store of wisdom -- of the requisite for Buddhahood.)[30]
ONE CAN BE VIRTUOUS WITHOUT HAVING ROOTS
Tsongkhapa explicitly argues that not only does anger not really destroy the roots of
virtue, it does not preclude the performance of virtuous acts. That is, even though one
cannot experience the effect of previous virtuous actions during the period in which
virtuous roots have been incapacitated, one's predispositions to perform virtuous acts
have not necessarily been eliminated.
We might have expected the opposite, namely, that one result of the
incapacitation of virtue would be a neutralization or reversal of its "habitual"
effect, the establishment of propensities for further virtuous action.[31] Apparently Tsongkhapa feels that although the seeds are incapacitated,
the habits are not necessarily broken. This makes sense because even angry persons may
have had much conditioning to predispose them to virtuous behavior. Certainly this would
be true in the cases of the bodhisattvas who become angry with each other or with common
beings. It would contradict what we observe daily to maintain that a moment of anger
dramatically and permanently alters an otherwise balanced or even benevolent personality.
If, then, one can accumulate more virtue, does this mean that there are
"fresh seeds" that might ripen as fortunate rebirth or pleasant experiences? If
so, does this not considerably reduce the negative effect of anger? Since this would
otherwise constitute a major loophole in Tsongkhapa's formulation, we can perhaps presume
that these seeds, too, are incapacitated by anger. This assumption is consistent with the
basic thrust of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the meaning of "cutting the roots of
virtue," since it looks forward toward aeons in which there will be no
ripening of the seeds of virtue rather than looking backwards at so many aeons of
virtue ruined. Of course, it leads to the apparent paradox that the stores of virtue may
be increased during the same period in which virtue's roots are "cut" and raises
questions such as: if new roots of virtue are produced -- and incapacitated -- does this
mean that some dormant "older" roots are activated? In other words, does anger
affect a certain quantity of virtuous roots?
VIRTUE THAT IS CUT ONLY PARTIALLY
Besides tempering what the Indian texts say about the existence of virtue and affirming
the possibility of its performance, Tsongkhapa also distinguishes between degrees of
anger, only the worst of which truly "cuts" the roots of virtue. Thus, he
appears to think that although in general, the seeds of virtue cannot ripen, there may be
exceptions. He says:[32]
The overcoming of a virtue does not mean that a virtue in one's continuum ceases to
exist after one generates anger; rather, anger harms the virtue's capacity to issue forth
an effect. The extent to which later fruition is harmed accords with the amount of harm
done, causing a small, middling, or great extinguishment of virtue as explained above.
Tsongkhapa is referring to the Upaaliparip.rcchaa Suutra, which said:
Upaali, I have not seen such a drawing of a wound or maiming as when a trainee in the
pure life (brahmacaarya) abuses [another] trainee in the pure life. Upaali, then
those great roots of virtue become diminished, thoroughly reduced, and eliminated. Upaali,
if you would not try to attack with your mind things such as burning logs, what can we say
about a body with consciousness?
Tsongkhapa interprets "diminished," "reduced," and
"eliminated" respectively as small, middling, and complete elimination. That is,
he argues that although it is true that anger cuts the roots of virtue, it may do so only
partially. It is not clear whether this means that in "small" or
"middling" eliminations only some roots of virtue are touched or whether it
means that all roots of virtue are diminished significantly, so that only partial
fortunate results are possible.
In short, Tsongkhapa argues that although the Indian texts warn of draconian
consequences to even a moment of anger--the loss of a thousand aeons of virtue, for
instance--this really means, in most cases, that there is a partial incapacitation of that
virtue for a long future period. The result is that some of the seeds of virtue might
actually ripen as a good body with good resources, etc., and because of this one could
probably continue to make progress as a bodhisattva on the paths to Buddhahood. However,
one's progress will be slow. A novice bodhisattva's anger at a mature bodhisattva, for
instance, will not de-commission her, but it will impede her development. Therefore,
"cut" not only means just "incapacitation" but also just "mostly
incapacitated." Perhaps anger incapacitates those roots of virtue that would have
ripened as lifetimes with superb conditions for the study of Dharma, enabling only those
roots of virtue that could ripen as lifetimes or circumstances that are relatively
mediocre.
CONTRADICTIONS, APPARENT AND REAL
According to Tsongkhapa's own reckoning, the journey over the paths to Buddhahood
requires no less than three periods of "countless" great aeons. In a
sense, then, a moment of anger amounts to no more than a stumble on the path. On the other
hand, who gets angry only once in a great while -- like a thousand aeons, for instance?
Even with Tsongkhapa's modifications, it seems likely that an ordinary person would have
little virtue not incapacitated by anger. The most serious problem with any of the
accounts of the effect of anger, then, is that they seem to leave open the possibility
that there might be persons who would be the karmic equivalent of indentured servants,
unable ever to be born into a body from which they could seek liberation. This would
contradict a deeply held dogma about the possibility of universal salvation, which
Tsongkhapa supports.[33] A single lifetime's episode of
anger (particularly if that life is spent largely being jealous of one or more real
bodhisattvas) could easily dig a hole so deep that even innumerable aeons seem too brief
to permit escape. For, one of the principal reasons why vice is vicious is that it impels
one into life after suffering life in which anger, among other negative emotions, is the
norm rather than the exception. The Tibetan tradition uses a famous analogy to sa.msaara
which compares the chances of being born as a human who can hear the Dharma to the odds
that a blind sea turtle, surfacing only once in a hundred years, will stick its head
through a golden yoke floating on a vast ocean. Adding multiple-aeon calculations on anger
is like changing the setting of this scenario to outer space. What odds remain? In short,
Tsongkhapa's efforts at moderation notwithstanding, the Indian sources seem to lead to an
untenable conclusion.
Second, an apparent self-contradiction in Tsongkhapa's interpretation is that he
himself maintains that regarding the roots of virtue, "cut" cannot be equated
with "delay" or else there would be no great difference between anger and other
negative emotions such as jealousy or gossiping, which also can delay the issuance of the
effects of virtue. He says: "The mere temporary postponement of maturation is not
appropriate to be the meaning of destroying the roots of virtue; otherwise, all the
nonvirtuous actions that have power would have to be set forth as destroyers of the roots
of virtue."[34] Based on our analysis, it is
difficult to see how his understanding of the destruction of roots of virtue amounts to
anything other than delay, since anger, though much more potent than any of these other kle"sas,
seems to be different only by degree. However, Tsongkhapa focuses upon the way in
which the other kle"sas cause a delay:[35]
The virtuous or nonvirtuous actions that have matured earlier temporarily stop the
opportunity for the maturation of other actions; however, merely those [earlier
maturations] cannot destroy virtue or nonvirtue and that is not set forth [in scripture as
the meaning of "cut" the roots of virtue].
The fruition of the seeds of any virtuous or nonvirtuous action can result in a birth
that prevents the maturation of seeds of its opposite. For instance, a seed established by
nonvirtue might ripen as a birth in one of the hells. Because such a life is devoid of
pleasure, seeds formerly established by virtue would lack the necessary conditions for
their maturation. These seeds would not have been rendered ineffective in exactly the same
way that anger renders seeds ineffective; they would not have been "cut" or
"scorched" or "withered" or otherwise directly neutralized. They would
be like patrons in line for a film who do not know that around the corner, near the box
office, others are cutting in. But what difference does it make that anger and pride, for
instance, operate differently? In practice, the result is the same.
OTHER QUESTIONS
By focussing on the narrow issue of how and to what degree anger affects the stores of
virtue, we have not yet asked several obvious questions that probably should be raised
before leaving the topic. First, why is anger seen to be so incredibly destructive? There
is no other religious tradition that approaches Buddhism in its negative assessment of the
consequences of a moment's angry outburst. What is special about anger for Buddhists?
Let us look at Tsongkhapa's arguments against anger (in which he follows the lead
of "Saantideva's Bodhisattvacaryaavataara).[36] (1)
Anger against others is irrational because others lack autonomy. They are helpless against
their own conditioning, which leads them to commit acts that provoke us to anger. It is
obvious that they lack autonomy because even though they themselves want happiness, they
commit acts that lead to suffering. (2) Similarly, if one thinks that others are
inherently annoying, they cannot rationally be blamed, since they are merely doing what is
their nature. (3) If, on the other hand, their annoying qualities are not inherent, then
those qualities are a merely adventitious product of conditioning and should not be held
against them. (4) The provocative person is only indirectly responsible for annoyance; he
or she is being used by hate in the same way that a person uses a stick. One should oppose
the annoyance, not the person ("love the sinner, hate the sin"). (5) Whatever
makes one angry is the result of one's own past actions. Annoying persons are nothing
other than the agents of one's own previous misdeeds. And (6) only a provocative person
gives one the opportunity to amass merit that can be helpful for spiritual progress.
Therefore, one ought to be grateful for the provocation.
Note that focus is on what happens to a person who gets angry, not on the
immediate consequences to the recipient of the anger. In other words, Tsongkhapa does not
argue that anger ought to be avoided because it leads to violence against others or
because it tends to provoke the recipient of one's anger into an equally angry state.
These would be legitimate arguments, but Tsongkhapa's concern is for the mental state of
the person who gets angry. He wishes to convince us that anger is simply irrational and
that forbearance is beneficial, not that anger is wrong because it leads to physical or
verbal acts (as he might argue if, for instance, he were addressing the faults of
intoxication). It is a reminder that karma is primarily about intention (sems pa,
cetanaa), not act.
What is noteworthy about these arguments is that most of them revolve around the
angry person's assumption of autonomy with respect to a provocateur--around the sort of
ignorance that Buddhists identify as the "root of sa.msaara." To be angry with
someone implies that one falsely imputes to that person an autonomous self, and the
dynamics of anger serve to reify that misconception. Tsongkhapa also demonstrates that
anger involves ignorance about oneself, for it indicates that one does not understand that
harms, real or imagined, arise only in dependence upon one's own continuum.[37] Because anger reifies ignorance, it is strongly contrary
not only to the development of wisdom but also to the development of compassion, which
grows only where the distinction of self-and-other has been weakened. Perhaps, then, anger
is felt to be in a different class than other nonvirtues because even more than desire,
etc., it solidifies that most vicious of all vices, ignorance? That is why anger joins
ignorance and desire to comprise the "three poisons" functioning as the hub of
the wheel of sa.msaara.
Moving to a second question, why do Buddhists say that anger affects virtue
instead of simply saying that anger is a nonvirtuous act that carries tremendous potential
for future suffering? Why place anger (and a few other nonvirtues, as described below) in
a different category than any other act? Perhaps the answer is that anger does not merely
set in motion a future retribution and habituate the one it grasps to further outbursts;
it creates a mood, or is one, which undermines positive thoughts and actions. It would not
be sufficient on the plane of ordinary experience to describe anger's effect only in terms
of future negative effects. We would surely also want to add that anger diminishes
positive movement. Thinking homologically, it must seem necessary in karmic theory to
claim that anger produces not only roots of nonvirtue but affects the roots of virtue as
well.
This is equally true of weighty virtues, such as giving. They establish roots or
seeds for future pleasant lives or experiences, but they also "purify"
nonvirtues (as we saw above when we considered the four powers that can temporarily
nullify nonvirtues). The language of cleaning, rather than that of destruction, is used;
for instance, we are not told that generosity "cuts the roots of nonvirtue."
With virtues, what Buddhist teachers emphasize are ways in which the fruition of the
virtues will enhance the attainment of liberation for oneself and others.[38]
Finally, one question that might be raised with regard to the purification of nonvirtue
is what consequence this might have for virtue. We have seen that according to Tsongkhapa,
anger can be nullified by the four opponent powers of remorse, restraint, etc.[39] But if anger is nullified by remorse, etc., is its
nullification of virtue similarly cancelled? Are the roots of virtue then freed? Or does
one just establish roots of liberation? Tsongkhapa, commenting in Great Exposition
on Bhaavaviveka's statement that even though there is purification by the four powers,
there is no destruction of seeds, concludes that "even though your accumulation of
sins is washed away through purification by the four powers, this does not contradict the
fact that you are slow to produce higher paths."[40] In
Illumination he is even more explicit; referring to the Sarvavaidalyasa.mgraha
Suutra, he says:[41]
If one abandons the doctrine as set forth in the suutra but confesses the fault three
times daily for seven years, the fruition of that deed is purified, but even at the
fastest ten aeons are necessary to attain endurance [i.e., to progress to the next path].
Thus, even though confession and restraint in many ways does not restore a path that has
become slower, it will purify experience of the fruition.
In other words, the purification of nonvirtues such as anger does not undo its
devastating effect on virtue. "Purification" prevents the issuance of unpleasant
effects, but does not rehabilitate good seeds gone bad.
SUMMARY
Anger, identified along with ignorance and desire as a "poison" that
generates sa.msaara, is singled out by Tsongkhapa as a particularly destructive emotion.
It is founded on ignorance and reifies it. It not only establishes potentials for future
occasions of suffering and habituates its subject to react similarly in future provocative
circumstances, but also has a considerable impact on the store of previously accomplished
virtue. The magnitude of its effect on virtue is dependent on (1) the degree of anger, (2)
the status of the person with toward whom it is directed, (3) the status of the person who
is angry, and (4) whether it is "purified" by the four opponent powers. To
expand briefly on these points:
(1) Anger has "small," "middling," and "great"
forms. Only anger that is of "great" intensity can "cut the roots" of
virtue. While lesser instances presumably can produce painful effects, they do not also
affect the ripening of virtue.
(2) Anger is most destructive that is directed toward persons who display great
compassion. Therefore, anger with buddhas and mature bodhisattvas is worst, anger with
lesser bodhisattvas next worst, anger with persons who have shown one great kindness next
worst, and so on.
(3) Conversely, the higher a person's status, the less damaging are his or her
instances of anger. If a mature bodhisattva were ever angry, the anger would have only
minor consequences; an ordinary person's anger with a buddha or mature bodhisattva, on the
other hand, can result in the cutting of the roots of virtue for a thousand aeons.
(4) Anger that is not addressed will fester and fulfill its potential for
destruction. Remorse, etc., can nullify the painful effects of anger. However, it is
impossible to undo anger's effect on virtue; at best the damage can be moderated.
Although the effect of anger--or, at least, intense anger--is to "cut the
roots (or, destroy the seeds) of virtue," this does not actually mean that virtue is
destroyed, for nothing other than a wisdom consciousness can destroy karma. Rather, the
roots or seeds of virtue are incapacitated. Consequently, one may be reborn many times in
the miserable realms below the level of humans, or, if born a human, will be unable to
make much spiritual progress.
Tsongkhapa's attempt to explain and moderate the position of the Indian texts is
not wholly convincing. On the one hand, since anger only temporarily incapacitates the
roots or seeds of virtue, it is not clear how it differs from other kle"sas
such as pride. Tsongkhapa himself says "cut" must mean more than
"delay" but in the final analysis it appears to mean that and nothing more. On
the other hand, even if anger means only incapacitation, its extraordinary damage
spreading over many aeons, based on as little as a moment's outburst, seems to make
liberation a practical impossibility for most persons. Tsongkhapa's interpretation would
have to be even bolder--or, anger of the root-cutting variety would have to be clearly
restricted to only the most extraordinary moments of rage--to avoid this untenable
conclusion.
REFERENCES
Buswell, Robert
- 1992 "The Path to Perdition: The Wholesome Roots and their Eradication," in
Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello (eds.) Paths to Liberation (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press).
Candrakiirti
- n.d. Madhyaamakaavataara. P 5261, P 5262, vol. 98. Edited Tibetan: Louis de La
Vallee Poussin, Madhyamakaavataara par Candrakiirti. Bibliotheca Buddhica IX
(Osnabr™ck: Biblio Verlag, 1970). English translations: C. W. Huntington, Jr., The
Emptiness of Emptiness (University of Hawaii Press, 1989). Chapters 1-5: Jeffrey
Hopkins, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (Valois, NY: Gabriel/Snow Lion, 1980).
Chapter 6: Stephen Batchelor, in Geshe Rabten, Echoes of Voidness (London: Wisdom,
1983): 47-92.
Cozort, Daniel
- 1989 "Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School: The Systematization of
the Philosophy of the Indian Buddhist Praasa"ngika-Maadhyamika School by the Tibetan
Ge-luk-ba Scholastic Tradition." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia.
Dhargyey, Geshey Ngawang
- 1980 Tibetan Tradition of Mental Development, 3rd edition (Dharamsala: Library of
Tibetan Works and Archives).
Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang
- 1980 Meaningful to Behold (London: Wisdom).
Gyatso, Tenzin, Dalai Lama XIV
- n.d. Dalai Lama at Harvard (Ithaca: Snow Lion).
Hirakawa, Akira
- 1990 A History of Indian Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).
Hayes, Richard P.
- 1994 "The Analysis of Karma in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako"sa-bhaa.sya,"
in Katherine Young (ed.), Hermeneutical Paths to the Sacred Worlds of India
(Atlanta: Scholar's Press).
Hopkins, P. Jeffrey
- 1980 Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion).
______.
- 1983 Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom).
Jamyang Shayba
- 1973 ('Jams dbyang bzhad pa). Dbu ma chen mo.Great Exposition of the
Middle Way/Analysis of (Candrakiirti's) "Entrance to (Naagaarjuna's ) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way'", Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the
Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate (dbu ma chen no/ dbu ma
'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs). In
Collected Works of 'Jam-dbya"ns-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje, Vol. 9, Drashikyil edition
(New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo). English translation (section on two truths): Guy Newland,
The Two Truths, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1988 (not included in
1992 book published by Snow Lion.)
______.
- n.d. Great Exposition of Tenets/Explanation of "Tenets", Sun of the Land of
Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning
of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All
Beings (grub mtha' chen mo/grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kin dang
zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba
kun skong). Drashikyil edition (Mundgod: Gomang). English translation (beginning of
the Praasa"ngika chapter): Jeffrey Hopkins in Meditation on Emptiness (London:
Wisdom, 1983).
Klein, Anne
- 1994 Path to the Middle: The Spoken Scholarship of Kensur Yeshey Tupten (Albany:
State University of New York Press).
Lopez, Donald
- 1992 "Paths Terminable and Interminable," in Buswell and Gimello (eds), Paths
to Liberation.
Pabongka Rinpoche
- 1991 Liberation in the Palm of Your Hand (London: Wisdom).
Pradhan, Pralhad (ed.)
- 1950 Abhidharma-Samuccaya of Asa"nga (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati).
Rahula, Walpola (tr.)
- 1971 Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie): (Abhidharmasamuccaya)
d'Asa"nga (Paris: Publications de l''Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient).
"Saantideva
- 1979 Bodhisattvacaryaavataara. (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa).
P5272, Vol. 99. English translation: Stephen Batchelor, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's
Way of Life (Dharamsala: LTWA).
Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa 1357-1419)
- 1985 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path/Stages of the Path to Enlightenment
Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings (lam
rim chen mo/skyes bu gsum gyi rnyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i
byang chub lam gyi rim pa). P 6001, vol. 152. The edition used for this article is the
Lhasa bya khyung edition published by Mtsho sngon mi rigs Printing Press. Other
editions have been published in Dharamsala (Shes rig par khang, 1964) and Delhi (Ngawang
Gelek, 1975).
______.
- n.d. Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakiirti's)
"Entrance to (Naagaarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'" (dbu ma la
'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal). P 6143, Vol. 154. The edition used
for this article is the Dharamsala Shes rig par khang edition. Another edition was
published in Sarnath, India (Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973).
Wayman, Alex
- 1991 Ethics of Tibet (Albany: State University of New York Press).
NOTES
[1] Anger is not unique as a negative emotion that can "cut the roots" of
virtue. In Illumination of the Thought Tsongkhapa cites suutra passages collected
in "Saantideva's "Sik.saasamuccaya that identify other extremely
counterproductive notions such as disbelief in cause and effect, boasting about spiritual
attainments one does not have, etc. as root-cutters. He also mentions that the Aakaa"sagarbha
Suutra identifies root infractions of bodhisattva vows as root-cutters. See Illumination:
57a.5-57b.1. Of course, none of these are said to have the force of anger. Return
[2] Tibetan Tripi.taka 764, Vol. 27 (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan
Tripi.taka Research Foundation, 1956). Cited in Tsongkhapa, Great Exposition. Return
[3] To represent Tibetan names, I use a modified form of Jeffrey
Hopkins' "essay phonetics" (Hopkins 1983: 19-22) system for Lhasa dialect. I
drop the hyphens and tonal marks, and I make an exception for the name Tsongkhapa, which
has become widely known in that form (it would otherwise be spelled Dzongkaba). I use the
phonetic form because it is well known that we can't remember what we can't pronounce, and
I think that the names of the best Tibetan scholars are worth remembering. Tibetan book
titles are translated into English to avoid the consonant-cluster nightmare of
transliterated Tibetan that alienates those who are not Tibetanists and to avoid the
phonetic form that alienates Tibetanists. The translation of titles also reminds readers
of book contents. Return
[4] Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim
chen mo) is the common name for Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly
Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings (skyes bu gsum gyi
rnyams su blang ba'i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa).
It is Tsongkhapa's grand synthesis of Indian materials pertaining to the enlightenment
path. It has been partially translated by Alex Wayman (Calming the Mind and Discerning
the Real in 1978 and Ethics of Tibet in 1991). A new translation of the entire
text is in preparation by a team working under the auspices of the Tibetan Buddhist
Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey and is scheduled for publication in three
volumes by Harper in 1996-98. My own interest in the topic of anger was raised by my
translation of the "ethical discipline" and "patience" chapters for
the project. Illumination of the Thought (dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal) is the
common name for Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakiirti's)
"Entrance to (Naagaarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'" (dbu ma la
'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal). It is Tsongkhapa's attempt, late in
life, to clarify the thought of Candrakiirti, who he saw in turn as the most important of
Naagaarjuna's Maadhyamika successors. Since Candrakiirti's discussion in the Madhyamakaavataara
revolves around the ten bodhisattva grounds, Illumination is also concerned with
many of the same issues as Great Exposition and is also characterized by copious
citations from Indian texts. It has been partially translated by Hopkins (1980; chapters
1-5) and Klein and Hopkins (Klein 1994; first part of chapter 6). Tsongkhapa makes similar
statements in both sources (in fact, much of the text of Illumination on this topic
has simply been lifted from Great Exposition. The principal difference is that in
the later Illumination he clarifies a few matters (for instance, the precise
parties to whom he believes the Indian texts refer). Return
[5] Identified by "Saantideva as a "text of the Aarya-
Sarvaastivaadins." The relevant portion is cited later. Return
[6] Although Tsongkhapa mentions Candrakiirti's and
"Saantideva's estimates in both Illumination and Great Exposition, he
reconciles the differences in only the later work, Illumination. Candrakiirti is
particularly important for Tsongkhapa's understanding of Maadhyamika, but "Saantideva
is particularly important for his understanding of the topic of patience. Return
[7] Admitting that Praj~naakaramati's commentary on the Bodhisattvacaryaavataara
says otherwise, mentioning only "sentient beings," Tsongkhapa says that he finds
this "difficult to believe." Return
[8] One famous counter-example is that of Milarepa, but his pattern
of mass-murderer-turned-saint is highly unusual. Of course, there are also instances in
which a bodhisattva guru might provoke a student's anger in order to teach the student,
and I am not certain how the tradition might work out the consequences. Return
[9] The extensive Gelukba sa lam (=bhuumi and maarga,
grounds and paths) literature is based on Maitreya's Abhisamayaala.mkaara (which in
turn is based on the Praj~naapaaramitaa literature, where the five-path scheme can be
dimly discerned) and Haribhadra's commentary; it also uses the five-path scheme of
Kamala"siila's Bhaavanaakrama (following a much older tradition evident even
in Sarvaastivaadin texts--Hirakawa 208ff.). In brief, the bodhisattva path of accumulation
begins with the initial generation of bodhicitta, and the path of preparation with
a union of calm abiding (zhi gnas, "samatha) and special insight (lhag
mthong, vipa"syanaa) with emptiness (stong pa nyid, "suunyataa) as
the object. Return
[10] Tenzin Gyatso: 83. Return
[11] The angry bodhisattva must still be a relatively low one
since a bodhisattva who has progressed past the third of the ten bodhisattva bhumis
(a pre-Mahaayaana system adapted to Mahaayaana in, for instance, the Da"sabhuumika
Suutra) is no longer ever subject to anger. This qualification can be found in
Maitreya's Abhisamaayala.mkaara and elaborated in subsequent treatments of the
bodhisattva path (cf. Candrakiirti's Madhyamakaavataara 3.13). The Gelukba scheme
would place such a person even lower. The second of the four parts of the path of
preparation is called "peak" (rtse mo, muurdhan) because it is the end of
the period in which one can generate anger that will sever the roots of virtue. Also,
Tsongkhapa makes a distinction between bodhisattvas whose faculties are sharp and those
whose are not. The former are the sort who needed to convince themselves that the Buddha's
teaching on emptiness was true, and therefore that Buddhahood was attainable, before they
could make the extraordinary commitment to strive for countless aeons to free all sentient
beings. Such persons might have attained a level of understanding equivalent to the path
of preparation even before they generated bodhicitta, the effect of which would be
to undermine (though not, of course, destroy) their predispositions to anger and desire. A
later commentator, the fifteenth century Jaydz™n Cho/oogyi Gyeltsen (rje
btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) who wrote the Maadhyamaka textbook--based on Illumination--still
in use by Sera Jay (se ra rje) Gelukba monastery, went even further. He claimed
that not only do intelligent persons realize emptiness prior to generating bodhicitta,
but most dull ones do also (see Newland: 43). Return
[12] Translation is Hopkins (1980: 212). Return
[13] Illumination: 54a.5-6. Translation follows Hopkins
(1980: 210). Return
[14] See Hopkins (1980: 154). Return
[15] It may not be the case that all instances of anger cut
the roots of virtue. As we will see, instances of anger may be differentiated on the basis
of their recipients, but are there other factors that make one instance worse than
another? Tenzin Gyatso, Dalai Lama XIV, says that it is still possible for someone past
the path of seeing to experience anger; however, since root-cutting anger is no longer
experienced past the second part of the even earlier path of preparation, it is clear that
this anger would not impel lifetimes of suffering. The implication is that a higher
bodhisattva's anger is not as serious, perhaps because to some extent its root cause,
ignorance, has been undermined. Does this also mean that not all instances of anger would
result in severance of the roots of virtue? Would Tsongkhapa agree with the Dalai Lama's
conclusion? Return
[16] Buswell: 107-134. Return
[17] Buswell: 118-123. Return
[18] The seventeenth century Gelukba abbot Jamyang Shayba ('jams
dbyang bzhad pa) makes this identification in his dbu ma chen mo (Great
Exposition of the Middle Way: 160a.5), which is a commentary on Candrakiirti's Madhyamakaavataara.
Return
[19] Pradhan: 35/Rahula: 78:58. Cited in Buswell: 119-20.
According to Tsongkhapa's Gelukba order, the mind's emptiness of inherent existence is a
"natural lineage" (rang bzhin gnas rigs) that is the Buddha nature of
each sentient being, and hence there is no one who will fail, eventually, to attain
Buddhahood. (For a review of reasons why some of Tsongkhapa's followers found difficulties
with these doctrines, see Lopez.) They interpret Asa"nga to mean that he sees five
lineages (rigs, gotra) for sentient beings, respectively those who follow the path
of the "Sraavakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas, those who switch from one of
the former to the latter, and those without a lineage for liberation. Return
[20] According to Tsongkhapa, the four opponent powers involve
remorse for transgressions; cultivating their antidotes; restraint; and taking refuge in
cultivation of the spirit of enlightenment (bodhicitta). Tsongkhapa does not
specify, at least here, whether these powers are sufficient to counteract all
nonvirtues, but that seems to be a commonly held opinion (cf. Pabongka Rinpoche: 218). Return
[21] Presumably, painful experiences must be due to actions of
previous lives or for which the person had no remorse, etc., possibly because they had
been forgotten. Return
[22] To be more precise, according to Gelukba exegetes, the path
of preparation is the level at which one has experienced a union of calm abiding (zhi
gnas, "samatha) and special insight (lhag mthong, vipa"syanaa)with
emptiness as one's object. The realization is powerful but is as yet one that is
inferential rather than direct. Return
[23] This paragraph is not Tsongkhapa's example, but my own, which
I include because it seems parallel to the example he furnishes. As I point out below,
Tsongkhapa wants to distinguish between the temporary suppression of fruitions by
the ripening of other, contrary, karmas, and the incapacitation of fruitions by
anger. That is, anger is qualitatively different from most other nonvirtues. That is why I
think that he himself would not use this as an example. However, there seems to be no
difference between the practical effects of these nonvirtues. Return
[24] In Illumination: 56b.1. Return
[25] Great Exposition: 401.12-14. Return
[26] Tsongkhapa and his followers consistently interpret the
"not other than" statements in Indian Maadhyamaka as meaning "not
inherently other" since, of course, things such as seeds and sprouts are
different from each other. On the other hand, they are individually not inherently
existent (rang bzhin gyis grub pa, svabhaavasiddhi) and do not have a relationship
of inherent otherness--a relationship that is not merely imputed by thought. Return
[27] Illumination: 127b.3-6. Return
[28] Praapti and other means to account for the
continuation of karma, such as the aalayavij~naana of Yogacaaraa texts, are
rejected by Tsongkhapa as entities not included in the conventions of the world (which he
thinks are, in contrast, upheld by suutras of definitive meaning and in the ultimate
commentarial tradition of Praasa"ngika-Maadhyamika), not to mention the fact that as
described by their proponents they could be established only by ultimate analysis. This is
a major topic of the "unique tenets of Praasa"ngika" section of Jamyang
Shayba's Great Exposition of Tenets (grub mtha' chen mo), which I translated
as part of my dissertation. For a recent discussion of Vaibhaa.sika positions and how they
are critiqued by Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako"sa-bhaa.sya, see Hayes. Return
[29] Of course, it also raises the question of how wisdom
could destroy seeds. This is reminiscent of a discussion by Jamyang Shayba (Great
Exposition of the Middle Way: 628.3-.5) on the "disintegratedness" of the
obstructions to omniscience (shes sgrib, j~neyaavara.na) for Buddhas. To become
Buddhas, of course, necessitated the destruction of those obstructions, but Jamyang
Shayba, wishing to avoid saying that Buddhas have anything like a taint in their
continuums, maintains that the disintegratedness of obstructions to omniscience does not
exist. His reasoning: in order to be a functioning entity, something must be capable of
producing an effect, and this disintegratedness cannot. Instead, the obstructions to
omniscience are completely "extinguished into the dharmadhaatu." I have
discussed arguments for and against Jamyang Shayba's position in my dissertation. Return
[30] Although I doubt that they are that to which Tsongkhapa
refers, there are seeds that are capable of producing more than one effect; e.g., a single
act of killing is said to be capable of ripening into numerous lifetimes in the miserable
realms. Even if some effects had ripened, those seeds would continue to exist. Return
[31] A single action produces a "seed" (sa bon, biija)
for a future effect, a "predisposition" (bags chags, vaasanaa) or
tendency to repeat that type of action, and an environmental effect of contributing to the
causal conditions for the world shared with other beings. Cf. Dhargyey: 87-88. Return
[32] Illumination: 57a.2-.3. I follow Hopkins' translation.
Return
[33] As Donald Lopez has shown (1992), Tsongkhapa seems not to
have believed that all sentient beings would inevitably reach Buddhahood, bringing an end
to sa.msaara; on the other hand, he would certainly claim that it is possible for
all of them to attain liberation and omniscience. Return
[34] Great Exposition: 401.19-20. Return
[35] Great Exposition: 401.17-19. Return
[36] This is a summary of Great Exposition: 405-414. Return
[37] This comes close to implying that every unpleasant occurrence
is a direct result of one's own karma. Tsongkhapa would not say this, I think; however, he
might argue that every unpleasant experience at least indirectly stems from one's past
actions insofar as one's actions are a part of the collective karma that creates and
sustains a shared environment. Return
[38] Cf. Buswell for an analysis of the importance of giving, in
particular, for the spiritual path. Giving can be seen not only as a virtuous act but one
that is a conditioner of insight. Return
[39] Kensur Yeshey Tupten, a great twentieth century Gelukba
scholar, adds (Klein: 85) that even prior to the direct cognition of emptiness that begins
to destroy karma on the path of seeing and above, conceptual understanding of emptiness
also purifies the seeds established by anger. Return
[40] Great Exposition: 402.4-6. Return
[41] Illumination: 55a.5-6. My translation follows Hopkins
(1980: 212). Return
Source: http://jbe.la.psu.edu/global.html