- Problematics of the
Buddhist nature of self
- Kenneth K. Inada
In dealing with the problematics of the Buddhist nature of self, we are treading on
familiar ground. In this article, however, I hope to avoid the all-too-familiar as much as
possible and open up fresh areas for a meaningful dialogical discourse. By the Buddhist
nature of self we are specifically focusing on that unparalleled doctrine of anaatman
("non-self"). Certainly, the doctrine was a rare Copernican turn in philosophic
insight in the East, first in India proper then subsequently outside of India, especially
in the Asiatic countries in general which developed unique social and cultural forms that
continue to exist today. It has, in short, influenced major changes in the outlook and
perspective in man and his livelihood; yet, we scarcely know what it means in its fullness
and how it has made the impact on him. For instance, ask any Buddhist, practicing or
professed, to explain the doctrine or its rudiments and chances are he will not be able to
convey to you its full meaning and significance in any satisfactory manner, barring
linguistic difficulties naturally. This is as it should be. For any positive or objective
accounting of the doctrine would surely be held suspect.
In many respects it is possible to assert
that Buddhism is a philosophy of anaatman. By saying this, I am not at all denigrating
other important doctrines in Buddhism; rather, I am trying to say that we can focus on a
single major doctrine, such as the anaatman, and introduce other relevant doctrines of
equal or lesser values as well in ways that are consistent and coherent to the whole
system of Buddhist thought. For it is an important character of Buddhist thought in
general that it includes traits of malleability and flexibility, adaptation and
absorption, and interrelationship and interpenetration. In this respect, the later
T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen doctrines, such as, "all in one, one in all," or
"all is one, one is all," are not entirely new to Chinese Buddhist thinking. The
roots go back to original Buddhist thought. So a Buddhist, nay even a strict academician,
cannot afford to experience clashes of ideas, concepts, or doctrines in Buddhism, although
clashes are inevitable for many. There is deep concern and uneasiness, to be sure, about
the way Buddhists at times set up contrasting doctrines side by side or even on the same
level of existence, for example, the relative (sa.mv.rti) and absolute (paramaartha)
natures of truth, sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, relational origination (pratiityasamutpaada)
and emptiness (`suunyataa), and so on. These only remind us of the subtleties and
profundities of the nature of Buddhist doctrines.(1)
I wish to reexamine the doctrine of
unaatman in such a way that the old problematics will be covered and at the same time new
problematics, in the sense of advancing the cause of Buddhist understanding will emerge:
It is not an easy task but well worth the effort. By this attempt, I will return to
Buddhist thought what many scholars have tried to deny it, namely, the place and function
of metaphysics. It would seem to me that such a denial is ungrounded and greatly restricts
or limits our understanding of Buddhism. It is so in several ways.
First, the denial is prompted by an overly
concern for the Buddhist goal, nirvaa.na, and the meditative discipline that leads to it
by "transcending" any empirical analysis. Meditation, after all, it is argued,
is the key to slough off the elements of the empirical realm and that within this process
metaphysics or metaphysical understanding is unnecessary (shades of logical positivism
perhaps) and in fact it becomes a burden on the practitioner.
We can understand the zeal to rid man of
any obstacles in his meditative practice but that is only one aspect of man's quest for
the goal. There is another aspect, equally important and perhaps more basic to his
attainments, which is the critical understanding of his own intimate empirical realm of
existence. In other words, the metaphysics of his own ordinary experiential world is the
most important grounds upon which he launches his meditative practice.
Second, the famous so-called
anti-metaphysical suutra, Cuu.la-Maalu.nkyasutta, is readily invoked to support the
denial. The technical term, avyakata, (indeterminate or inexpressible nature), for
example, is interpreted to signify the inanity or inefficacy of any metaphysical
principles or descriptions. In one instance, the question of whether the tathaagata
(Enlightened One) survives death is metaphysical and does not elicit an answer, thus
suggesting the Buddha's alleged silence. But it can also be argued that the sutra is not
really pointing at the bankruptcy of metaphysics or metaphysical thinking as such. The
Buddha's constant or repeated entreaty to Malunkyaputta that the question "does not
fit" (the case) can be interpreted to mean (out of several other interpretations
naturally) that his so-called metaphysical imputations, for example, rathagata, soul,
death, finitude, infinitude, and so on, are wrongly constructed or presented and therefore
wrongly understood. I will treat the nature of metaphysics shortly.
Finally, by pointing at some of the
principal doctrines, such as `suunyataa, nirvaa.na, dharma, pratiityasamutpaada, anitya
and anaatman, it is pointed out that these do not have substantial contents and therefore
they are metaphysically neutral or indifferent. In this instance, I believe the denial is
very much pre- in their true natures before they are cast into the same so-called
non-substantial and thus non-metaphysical basket. It is a simplistic device but a wrong
one. It is wrong for the reason that not one of the doctrines has been given the chance to
apply or manifest itself cogently in one's experience. Of course, to demonstrate this is a
very difficult task, but it still is important to indicate that to the detractors of
metaphysics Fall the burden of proof on experiential matters. It seems quite ironic,
moreover, that such detractors of metaphysics go merrily along to indulge in the doctrines
of Buddhism in ways that not only suggest but strongly indicate the place of metaphysics
and the function of metaphysical thinking. They reserve the right of course to discard the
metaphysical ladder after using it, Wittgenstein. But can we or do we dispense with the
ladder so readily? This is a question that requires further investigation.
To be sure, there is no exact term for
metaphysics in Buddhism, nor in Indian philosophy in general for that matter. This may
seem to be a short-coming, but for us I would prefer to interpret it as a real challenge,
an invitation to explore deeper into the elements of the Buddhist system. On this, it
should be noted at the outset that Buddhism is not a well-defined system of thought with a
clearly defined framework into which all the fillers can be readily thrown or framed so
that both the framework and the fillers can always be identified in no uncertain terms.
Such a framework is a fiction, a bad myth, that simply does not stand. It is an ungrounded
myth or ideal to which we must address ourselves and which I hope to clarify in the course
of this article.
It further seems to me that the detractors
of metaphysics do not distinguish between good and bad metaphysics. They seem to be
repulsed from the start and quite abruptly, perhaps, by the term itself, aghast that one
could be so bold and presumptuous as to attempt an analysis of man and the world with such
categorical verve as seen, for example, in some of the idealistic and materialistic
systems. Granted that sheer absolutism or sheer relativism or even sheer materialism has
no legitimate place in sound metaphysics, as I am willing to admit that the detractors
rightly observe in the imputations of eminent realities in these so-called isms in both
the Western and Eastern traditions; still, it would be folly to be ignorant of or to
dismiss outright the quest in man for the relative and the absolute nature of things. My
point is that the eminent realities referred to within the context of relative and
absolute systems are somehow misplaced or misdirected or misguided. They are so because of
the truncated or one-directional way in which they are treated within a seemingly coherent
system of metaphysics. The proponents are in such a hurry to construct that system that
they either miss or gloss over much of the nature of experiential content that constitutes
existence. It is so easy to see and count a few realities (or elements of existence) and
to indulge in sweeping generalizations about the reality of the nature of things. I call
this form of metaphysics deviated. It is bad metaphysics. It is a myopic view, a limited
or constricted type of metaphysics.
So, granted that bad metaphysics Is
prevalent among us, even with religious and philosophical thinkers of the first order,
there is still a place for good or proper type of metaphysics. In this respect, I cannot
help but recall Alfred Whitehead's famous caution:
Whatever is found in `practice' must lie
within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include
the 'practice', the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be no
appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so long as we remain contented with our
metaphysical doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities
which apply to all the details of practice.(3)
In Buddhism there is an incredible amount
of concern for the mechanics of `practice', a deep concern for the ingredients that are
necessary for the description of a truly great metaphysical system of experience.(4) In
many ways, its metaphysical system is unique in that it probes deeper than most Western
systems in accounting for the complex mechanics of man's being including certain elements
that are unique to Buddhism. These elements will emerge presently as our discussion
develops.
In the main, then, anti-metaphysicians
have been critical of any and all ontological assumptions. With both idealistic and
materialistic strains of metaphysics, there is a tendency, on the one hand, to indulge in
a form of "Object"' or "objects of discourse," such as the Absolute,
God, Brahman, One, Unity, Principle, and the like, relative to the macrocosmic realm or,
on the other hand, to identify certain atomic components, such as the self, soul,
consciousness, elements of existence, and so on relative to the microcosmic realm. Unless
one is wary, these implicit or explicit objectifications have the tendency to result in
definitive ontological natures that frame one's life and life perspectives.
Even in Buddhism, the svabhrivic
(self-nature) ontology of the Abhidharma-Sarvastivada tradition was immediately criticized
by the Sautrantika as well as by the Maadhyamika (that is, by Nagarjuna) and the
Mahaayaana tradition in general. But we would certainly be remiss were we to dismiss
ontologies solely on the basis of their being bad metaphysics. What is important here is
to distinguish the kind of ontology referred to that we should be wary of (namely, the
svabhaavic type) from the kind that we should be able to explore and accommodate if proved
to be worthy as well as relevant to our experiences.
Needless to say, the svabhavic type
belongs to bad metaphysics and thus cannot be perpetrated. But what about the other type?
This other type of metaphysics accounts for an ever-widening and deepening nature of human
experience. It came about in Western philosophy relatively late, picking up momentum, for
example, with the ideas of Hegel, Darwin, Bergson, Morgan, nineteenth-century science,
Einstein, Heisenberg, Heidegger iihd showing up clearly in Whitehead's organic philosophy.
In the East, the Buddha had already expounded the rudiments of such a thought twenty-five
hundred years earlier. The detailed comparisons between the East and the West.on the
matter is unnecessary at this point, but suffice it to say that the principle of organic
process philosophy was known and lived through by man earlier than usually noted. In the
West of course Heraclitus is the shining example of an earlier sage who keyed on the
principle of change and process but, alas, few took him seriously. Plate carried a thought
further to some extent, but he could not really accommodate it within his great doctrine
on the Idea of the Good. Nor did Aristotle, with his sweeping architectonic view of
things, really succeed in accommodating organic philosophy. His thoughts rather fired a
concern for the substantial treatment of things. All this is not to fall complacent with a
false impression that modern man has understood and accepted process philosophy all along
as a way of life. I might add that the situation can also be applied to modern Buddhists,
scholars and practitioners alike.
It is my contention that organic process
philosophy is marvelously depicted in the Buddhist philosophy of anaatman. Let us move
into its implications. Anaatman is etymologically, an-aatman, or the negation of the
aatman (self); it connotes the exact opposite of aatman. Logically, there is no doubt that
this is very clear but the question remains whether that is all there is to the concept.
Does it convey to us the full meaning? To say that there is no soul or self, or that the
soul or self is negated does not really advance the true understanding of the concept of
anaatman, except on the linguistic and logical levels.(5) The antithetic treatment of
aatman-anaatman does not really resolve the question or even come close to clarifying it.
As a matter of fact, Buddhist thought never saw the aatman view as wholly antithetic to
its own aatman view. In my understanding, it seems to be a simple case of imposing bad
metaphysical elements on the experiential process or confusing bad and good metaphysics.
The problem is much more complicated than
we suppose since even on the linguistic and logical levels we go on to accept the aatman
concept as if we know all about it and premise it for further manipulation. The atman and
its spiritual cognate, Brahman, are essentially non-cognitive or non-logical entities, and
yet we do not cease to give them circumscribed epistemological meanings. The aatman
concept still remains in the province of the Hindu who has his own metaphysics as well as
the faith and will to pursue it. What the historical Buddha reacted against was the
inadequacy of the Hinduistic metaphysics to account for the so-called worldly empirical
nature of things. It was not a simple overturn of the aatman concept into nullity but a
unique overhaul of the understanding of human experience. The famous Middle Doctrine in
Buddhism specifically cautions us to avoid the extremes of substantialism (sassatnvaada)
and non-substantialism (ucchedavaada). I believe the doctrine supports my view that the
extremes (anta) refer to the ends or elements that are considered obviously bad
metaphysics, both of which are grounded in experience.
In many respects, however, the Buddhist
introduction of the anaatman concept was a complete turn around from the prevailing aatman
concept. Where the latter attempted to see the whole from the metaphysical totality,
illusion notwithstanding, the former attempted to see the whole as much as possible from
the metaphysically fragmentary nature of things.
Where the latter presupposed the
aatman-brahman identity explicitly or implicitly from the beginning to the end, the former
delved into no presuppositions at all and denied any bad metaphysical elements to
influence such concepts as jiva (soul) sattva (sentient being) and pudgala (personal
identity). Where both invoked the indeterminate principle (avyaak.rta), they used it for
different purposes, namely, the latter used it to explain away the barriers relative to
the aatman-brahman identity and all things related to it, but the former used it to
exhibit or expose the limitations or shortcomings of relying solely on the entified
empirical concepts (prajn~napti). Where the latter was involved in a kind of emanation
theory of being in a relatively "steady-state" affair, the former remained true
to a strictly naturalistic and evolutionary basis for man's being, a process that indeed
defies one's imagination and rightly so but one that purports to have all the ingredients
of a consistent system of process thought. I have elsewhere argued that the latter aims at
a metaphysical absolute regarding the nature of being, whereas the former aims at an
ontological absolute of being.(6)
In Buddhist metaphysics, we are focusing
on the concrete nature of experiential reality. And this reality is nothing but the
ontological nature of the individual being, his entire experiential content. The reader
will be quick to note that I am already using terms that relate to or depict certain
realities or ontological objects, something I had previously criticized. This is an
inevitable circumstance and a practical necessity. Even the historical Buddha, it will be
recalled, was quite mindful and cautious regarding this matter, and yet he had no recourse
but to use the prevailing language to convey the intent and purpose of seeking that
concrete nature of reality (yathaabhuutam) . In essence, then, we are in search of that
reality within the matrix of things, however laden it may be with the elements of the
provisional and conventional natures.
Reality is like a maze. If one is caught
up with the elements of the maze, one is prevented from seeing the passage-way and
contrariwise, if one is not, then the passage-way is there without the usual obstructive
elements and thus one is able to move freely and easily. In other words, one understands
the maze for what it is or sees it at a glance, so to speak. There are no impediments. It
is rather a habit of our ordinary epistemological nature that we try to catch everything
in one's experience even by imposing on it unsupportable metaphysical elements. A good
example is the Cartesian framework that reduces all epistemological entities to clarity
and distinctness. It should be noted that it is one thing to say that epistemological
entities must be clear and distinct but it is quite another to say that they relate to
reality. And still another to say that reality must be clear and distinct.
So in Buddhism, regardless of the false
impositions we make, we are dealing with the metaphysics of being which is in truth a
reference to individual ontology. But individual ontology is also process ontology.
Therefore, it is not an ontology in the usual sense. The three cardinal characteristics in
basic Buddhism, namely, anicca dukkham, anatta (impermanence, suffering, and non-self)
point up to this unique ontology. The first, reminds us clearly that everything is a
moving phenomenon or a moving ontology. The "great chain of being" is not merely
a static linking phenomenon where the nature of being persists in linear fashion; rather,
it is a novel creative process based on the ever fresh dynamic nature of the links where
nothing persists or endures.
Thus we may now be able to assert that
there is a stream of reality (bhava) in the general or primal sense, and also a stream of
consciousness (bhava.nga, sa.ntaana) in the finer and more technical sense. The stream
cannot be framed, either substantially or in the usual ontological sense, unless we are to
speak of it conventionally. Perhaps, I may be permitted to say that the stream of reality
has to do with process ontology whereas the stream of consciousness with epistemological
process, although the latter process necessarily "rests" upon or functions
within the realm of the former.
We might also add that in the strictest
sense there is process ontology but no ontological process that refers to static entities
in movement. Again, in a different sense it might be asserted that there is ontological
understanding of the nature of things but no understanding of ontological (static)
elements as such. It is this unique ontological understanding that contributes to good or
proper metaphysics. In other words, there seems to be a widening receptacle, a field of
being, that aids in the understanding of the nature of things. In this, however, the
ontological elements do not constitute that receptacle or field of being, for the focus is
always on the dynamic field of existence.
All this is indeed paradoxical and
puzzling but process philosophies are of this nature. Yet they are not contrary to or
contradictory of the facts of experience. indeed, they are most adaptive and accommodative
of the facts. From the Buddhist standpoint, the seeming contradictions occur from several
causes or bases. They may arise, for example, from the inability to distinguish between
the provisional or conventional and the ontologically absolute natures of being. Or, it
may be due to the inability to follow the middle doctrine which eschews us to stay clear
from the extremes as discussed earlier.
It goes without saying that in process
ontology we are concerned with the dynamics of the specious present. The present is
specious because its locus of reality is never at a standstill or steady and is thus
unaccountable in any definitive sense, especially in terms of the manipulable data and
aspects of things. Moreover, it can now be stated that the locus of anaatman is likewise
specious and therefore we must concentrate on it.
The problematic of the specious present is
somewhat aggravated by the plain fact that we normally assign only a one dimensional
framework to the process of being. That is. we normally understand temporality to be a
simple one-directional flow. But it is much more complicated than that. That present, in
actuality, is a multi-faceted, multi-directional phenomena which the Buddhists early on
sensed and captured in their doctrines. How that multi-dimensional nature manifests in our
experiences is the crux of the problem in our understanding of the specious present. The
difficulty is basically one in which we are asked to be both spectator and participant of
the activities, a difficulty as old as Platonism in the West. This spectator-participant
view or approach is so basic yet so fraught with difficulties of understanding that the
average intellect and even great minds find it totally incomprehensible, on the one hand,
and beyond reach, on the other.
Naturally, we refrain from resorting to
meditative devices of any form for the understanding since we believe that man must still
initially seek a naturalistic understanding, bringing into sharp focus all the canons of
logic or the intellect together with the utilization of the empirical data in the most
exhaustive sense. And in many ways, we have not really taxed our reason and its power to
anything like the optimum degree of usage when it comes to intimating ourselves with the
nature of reality. The same can be said about our intimacy with the empirical realm. For
the most part, we simply get carried away with the mechanics or the elements thereof and
these in turn result in subtle dogmatic stands, be they psychological, social,
metaphysical, or whatever.
Again, we do not have the time to enter
into the reasons for the rise of the dogmatic stands. Rather, it is more important now to
focus on one aspect and educe the subtle and unknown ways in which the experiential
process is taking place. Moreover, the failure to understand this aspect has resulted in
grave misgivings and at times irreparable damage to the person in his pursuit of a proper
development of the enlightened way of life.
The aspect in question upon which I wish
to focus is the ontological grounds and nature of the process. Failure to understand this,
in a rather circuitous or circular way, results in the most damaging phenomenon, namely,
the ontological unclarity of existence or one's clouded nature of being (avidyaa). Of
course, I am not implying at all that one cannot go on living in this clouded nature of
being, as there are abundant examples personified by our normal samsaric (du.hkha-ridden)
pursuits. Yet, the message of Buddhism is that there must be a constant vigil and search
for the opposite, that is, the pursuit for the ontological clarity of existence. This is
the search in the right direction of the Buddhist nature of self, the unatmnn. But this
search is futile and unproductive should one adhere to old methods and framework. This is
not to say that the old methods and framework are to be discarded or abandoned completely;
that would be a total destruction or negation which no Buddhis would ever sanction. What
is then called for is the "reorganization," or "reconstitution,'' if you
will, of the ontological framework that I propose. Moreover, certain scholars have
conveniently labeled such reorganization or reconstitution as a systematic
deontologization. To a target extent, this is true and cogent. However, as I see it, the
more important question is. After deontologization, what? True, Naagaarjuna's systematic
critique of his opponent's position is an attempt to deontologize his realistic
tendencies. But Naagaarjuna's critique does not end there. He will not leave his opponent
suspended in so-called deontologized mid-air. He, like all true Buddhists, will try his
best to return the deontologized nature back to solid grounds, that is, in constant
contact with true reality, without the traces or vestiges of the mind's imposition on
reality as such (tattva), In short, deontologization is at best a half-way measure, a
conceptual device, that needs to be brought back to the full experiential content in the
total process.
Let us proceed to examine further the
specious present. As mentioned earlier, the Buddhist will premise two types of continuum;
one the continuum of being (bhava) , the other the continuum of consciousness (sa.ntaana,
bhava.nga). Though different in definition and application they are really indicating
certain aspects of the self-same flow of existence. The former refers to the general
nature of being and the latter to the subtle links relative to conscious plays. Regardless
of the differences then, the specious moment is functional in both. They both exhibit the
ways in which the continuum is a fact of existence. The specious moment, as the literal
center of being, is always real. But the question to be posed here is, In what way is it
sustaining its reality or its real "contents" in the flow of existence? Or, How
can we speak of it in its speciousness?
It can be said that the Buddha came to
grips with the concept of passage, nay actual passage itself, in a most profound way.
Empirically, he perceived rightly that the rise (utpaada) of a moment is seen and so is
its fall or subsidence (bha.nga or anityataa). And he also perceived that there is a
duration (sthita) in which the moment is full blown, so to speak, or attains fruition
(vipaaka).(7) These three aspects of the moment are incessantly involving themselves in
such a unique way that even graphs or diagrams fail to describe the full import of the
process. Yet, it is highly important now to utilize these devices in order to delineate,
if only in a small way, the peculiarities of the process.
(1) First, the flow of existence in the
simplest possible manner is illustrated with an arrow thus:--> or it may be expanded
into a "bloated" arrow thus: -->to depict the content of the flow. In either
illustration, it says or describes relatively little, if any, of the full experiential
content. At best, it only shows the directional flow of the process. And so we move on to
the next diagram.
(2) The second diagram can be illustrated
thus: --> The arrow is quite gratuitous but necessary for conceptual understanding.
This diagram is an improvement over the first but it still is inadequate and perhaps is
misleading in its simplicity. It gives the false impression that the moments of existence
go on in a substantially one-dimensional fashion and in a predictable way. The idea of a
causal chain here is too simplistic. Again, it does not really tell us much about the
experiential content prior and posterior to the specious moment. Nor does it address
itself to the crucial question of the continuity of moments. And finally it suggests a
reversion to the normal ontological understanding of process that could only lead to bad
metaphysics.
(3) The third diagram does address to the
problem of continuity very well. It is depicted as follows:
3a. --> Although it illustrates the
interlocking nature of the moments, we can improve on it in the following way. 3b.
----> This diagram shows up the truly interlocking nature of the moments, not only
between two moments but a multiple-faceted nature of several moments within the flow. In
this respect, it is closer to the reality of the process although confusing in its
implicated nature of things.
(4) Finally, at this point, we need to
have a closer microscopic look at the moment in the making. We might then "blow
up" the present specious moment in the making thus:
The specious present is equivalent to one
of the rings in the above interlocking phenomena, either in 3a or 3b, and the past and the
future could very well correspond to the prior and posterior natures, respectively, in the
continuum with the proviso that the future is not yet but has all the potential of
becoming.
Each specious present is a carving-out
phenomenon with respect to the continuum of existence. It has a past from which it has
basically but not entirely arisen. In other words, the past is necessary to the present
but not sufficient for its own being. It also has a future in terms of latent potential
for being. However, what is unique here is the fact that the specious present can
"look" two ways, that is, to the components (or realms) of the past and the
future for the constitution or creation of its own being. The interlocking phenomena must
be viewed in this sense. That is to say, there is every bit of the past, actually as well
as potentially, within the specious present. Or, it can be said that there is a sense of
the concept of reverse causality functioning here to check the wholly one directional
causal chain of moments. Perhaps the Buddhist accounting here is in correspondence with
the White headian concept of assymmetry, which states that the flow of existence involves
a reverse or assymmetric relationship of the specious present to the past and not merely a
vice versa phenomenon, in other words, the past symmetrically relates to the present and
the present, in turn, to the future. The minutely circular interpenetrating and
interlocking diagram in 3b shows to an extent the symmetric as well as assymmetric
dimensions in the continual flow of existence. To illustrate this further and to gain some
understanding of the subtle movements, we must proceed to the next diagram.
(5) To illustrate the temporal flow with
the more subtle features. I diagram thusly:
A glance at this diagram will show the
unique implications of the real temporal characteristics involving the past, present, and
future. The locus of reality or the Bow of reality resides in the specious present, but it
is never left alone for it not only creates in cooperation with the past and becomes a
past as well, but it also is intimately related to a potential future in the process. This
sounds odd or even absurd on first reading, to be sure, but at least the diagram does
sufficiently justify the nature of the profound doctrine of momentary existence in
Buddhism (k.sa.nika-bha.nga). For, there is undoubtedly the rise of the moment, not ex
nihilo but in full view or cooperation of the components of the temporal dimensions. The
specious present gains something but at the same time loses something in its procession to
the next triadic contextual matrix of dynamics. In this way, the continuum is fulfilled in
terms of content and simultaneously exhibits its open endedness. The gaining and losing
phenomena are dependent largely on the conditions or materials prevailing with respect to
the total nature of the relational conditions (pratyaya, paccaya). And in the search for
the understanding of these phenomena, we return finally to a few significant Buddhist
doctrines that are relevant to the process thus far delineated and which in turn should
make us realize that the anaatman doctrine is supreme here and that it is infinitely
superior to the aatman approach to reality.
In diagram 5 I have used the phrase,
"nisus of being," for the real temporal flow of existence. It is a nisus in that
there is a striving, a motive, to perfect one's own being, Life is a creative process in
this sense but not always in the best or propitious sense. The Buddhist calls this
relational origination (pratiitya-samutpaada which is indeed one of the most difficult
concepts to fathom orcepts to fathom or grasp, much less to feel its functional dimensions
in our everyday activities.
It depicts the becoming process (bhava) in
its most unique Form uniqueness in the sense that the process is another way of
delineating on how the ordinary conception of the self becomes or is at once a non-self
phenomenon. The dynamic character of this concept, which is so depictive of the subtle
movements in the microscopic realm of existence, issues Forth the challenge to understand
the anaatman concept. The two concepts, pratityasamutpaada and anaatman. may seem so
distanced yet are so proximate to our nature of being: indeed. in the strictest sense,
they are referring to the self-same reality of existence from two novel but technically
isomorphic natures. By asserting this I am not trying to confuse the issue. Rather, I wish
to call to attention a desideratum for a closer and critical examination of the ordinary
situation in which we continue to exist so that the nature of Buddhist reality could be
understood or realized in its own right. Again, all this is cryptic but, only in the hope
of showing up the problematics that the becoming process or the nisus of being cannot be
reduced to a simple, cut-and-dried type of analysis or manipulation of the elements, be
they dharmas in the case of Buddhism, in and of themselves as they occur in all facets of
our experiences. In the process, the elements (dharmas) have no ontological nature or
status, either in an a prior or a posteriori sense. For, their "participation"
in the process is the fact of the process itself, just as the process itself properly
reflects the various elemental presence. I believe that Diagram 5 is conducive to the
Sarvaastivaadin's (Vaibhaa.sika's) choice of the third explanation for the description of
the differences in the temporal flow as stated as a change of condition
(avasthaaapari.naama). The relevant passage states thus:
Thus it is that among all proposed
explanations the (remaining one alone), the third in number is right, that which maintains
a change of condition (or function). According thereto the difference in time reposes on
the difference in function; at the time when an element does not yet actually perform its
function, it is future, when performing it, it becomes present; when after having
performed it, it stops, it becomes past.(8)
We should now have a better picture of the
way in which the specious present is flowing as the nisus of being. But I hasten to add
here the final diagram to depict the way in which the aatman approach vitiates the nisus.
(6) The specious present relative to the
aatman-process is now represented thus: It will be seen that the linear symmetrical flow
has all the trappings of a causal or deterministic system. The temporal flow is firmly set
in the sense that the present came from the past and that it will eventually enter into or
become a new phenomenon known as the future. But the problematic involved here is that
this type of temporal flow does not, or is unable to accommodate new or novel contents or
elements that are added and at the same time to and one which reason by itself fails to
answer. A deterministic or even semi-eterministic nature would invariably introduce a form
of "transmigration" of the elements of being which is so often erroneously
attributed to Buddhism. The Buddhist approach was not only profound but practical. It did
not shirk the problem by presenting a mere theoretical accounting of the facts of
experience but went deeply into the components of the experiences themselves in order to
present a holistic view that included both the tangible as well as non-tangible contents
of the said experiences It started off naturally with the accepted self-view (aatman
process) but quickly indicated that once such a view is set up or the conditions relative
to it are perpetuated, there will be no prevention of the limiting and restrictive
phenomena from Occurring. For the Buddha came to an understanding that if man were left
alone he would continue to assert his basic drives. namely. the desires or thirst for life
(t.r.s.naa). Close examination, however, will point up the fact that both thirst and the
object of thirst are mutually limiting or restrictive in the sense that they isolate
themselves from the rest of the run of nature of from the experiential process itself.
Yet, nothing in nature or in the experiential process is really independent, isolated, or
aloof, except perhaps when we deal with them in abstract or speculative terms. The
Buddha's insight probes deeply here to make a significant contribution toward the
subtleties of the thirst for life. The drive is prominently present, as we can easily see,
but what makes that drive "counterproductive" is the tendency in it to be
"overextending'' and thereby "over productive." In this respect, there is
no real appreciation for the drive or thirst itself. for this is warped or unbalanced In
short, the fullness of the drive or thirst is not realized or implemented. What then is
this strange new obstructive element? It is nothing but the clinging or attaching
phenomenon present in each thrust of the drive or thirst. The technical term for it is
upaadaana, a term which is basic and yet little understood The thirst or drive is
ever-present, as stated earlier,. but it overextends itself as soon as the upaadaana force
is present.
Upaadaana usually goes hand in hand with
t.r.s.naa, but it does not necessarily have to be so. In other words, the passions and
desires are vital parts of our experiences but they need not be restrained by the clinging
phenomenon, i.e., they can go on in a purely detached manner without the clinging elements
of being.
In many respects, there is an element of
contradiction in the two terms; at least there is an element of in congruency in treating
them together. For, on the one hand, t.r.snaa (thirst) is a force, an activity that lungs
forward in the experiential process and on the other. upaadaana (attachment) is a holding,
steadying pattern that keeps the process from lunging forward in the sense of
incorporating new elements. The former is a basic drive, while the latter is a subtle
aspect of that drive which becomes narrow and specialized by the latters presence. The
latter is always ancillary to the former and in its expended nature counters the flow of
the basic flow. While the former thrives on process the latter thrives on static
objectification. Or, it can be said that while the former is a moving ontology, the latter
is a static type of ontology. the type that becomes grist for the conceptual mill and
perpetuates bad metaphysics. Yet, despite all, the truth of the whole matter is that both
are very much functioning mutually in that the function of one invariably entails the
function of the other, and that the function of both only obviates the fact of the subject
in its elemental perceiving or grasping activities; this is the assertion of the aatman
process. Thus the perpetuation of the atman-process theory, although giving way to
biological, psychological, and phenomenological phenomena, still is a basic ontological
phenomenon. And the failure to understand the ontological implications, both in the
ordinary sense of static objectification and in the true sense of non-objectifiable
process flow, has only impeded a real grasp of the reason for man's suffering (du.hkha),
For, indeed, one of the most basic origins of the suffering state is the inability of man
to cope with the flow of existence or the plain fact that life and its elements are
momentary or transitory.
It is curious to note that the self
(aatman) as a subject has really, in turn, become an objective component in the process of
perception. It as well as the object of perception have both become ontological objects,
and, in consequence, a mild from of rigidity has set in. And thus the ontological nature
and the ontological dimensions seen and employed within the framework of the three
temporal dimensions begin to rule the order of the process itself. The same phenomenon can
also be said of the five skandhas (constituents of being) which manifestly show up the way
in which the aatman-process is narrow and obstructive. In the famous Burden Sutta, 9) it
is repeatedly stated that the skandhas are the burden or the carrying of the burden
(bhaarahaara) of life. In the organic skandhic structure, the mere structuring becomes a
burden in the sense that they in tote would spell out some form of an objective self. The
sutta goes on to say that the "burden-taking is the individual," and that
"the craving which tends to re-birth, accompanied by delight and passion, taking
delight here and there, namely the craving for sensual pleasure, for existence, for
non-existence, for non-existence."(10) Edward J. Thomas makes a telling point that
the term, bhaarahaara, can be translated either as "burden-taking" or
"burden bearer."(11) He aptly states that in either case, it points up to the
concept of an individuality (pudgala) or a self (aatman).
Now, Why is it a burden? With diagram 6 in
view, we can show that the five skandhas have the tendency to construct a steadying
ontological entity called a self or a subject that moves through the temporal periods,
rather than to be the process itself. That is, the skandhic classification, in terms of
each element or any combination, seems to arrest the flow, whereas in reality there is no
arresting possible at all. From rttpu (corporeality) to vij~naana (consciousness), all the
skandhas seem to statically structure a self or an image thereof. This fact is also
supported by the concept of upaadaana where the aatman concept is considered to be one of
the four forms of ignorant outflows (aasravas), the others being sensual desire (kaama),
false or dogmatic view (d.r.s.ti), and ritualistic following of conduct (`siila). These
outflows are the seemingly blind irrational forces that seem to dominate the Bow by their
rigid moorings on life's process. But they, as well as other structural entities (for
example, skandhas, aayatanas, dhaatus, dharmas) , are the makings of still another rigid
process, perhaps the worst form possible, namely, the rebirth process or the relinking of
the staticized (upaadaana-bound) nature of being.(12) The rebirth concept is quite
problematic in Buddhism. In general, there are two ways to view it. One is that it couId
be taken to be the phenomenon of an after life in terms of the last so-called clingings or
attachment remaining in man. This seems to be the accepted religious or moral view. The
other more philosophical view is to take rebirth to mean the clingings relative to the
moment-to-moment existence, The latter is preferred since it is the more tangible and
plausible of the two views and also for the fact that it can be accommodated very nicely
in diagram 6.
The question of karman is also quite
relevant here, Karmic acts are, in the main, deeds that are determined by one's clinging
phenomenon within the process, There is a cessation of that phenomenon should there be a
subsidence of the clinging action and which, in turn, immediately exhibits the undefiled
nature of being. The early texts speak of different kinds as well as different forms of
kurman.(13) Regardless of the kinds or forms, karmun is indeed an accounting of the
process of being in its exhibitive and sustainable aspects, and thus it only promotes the
perpetuation of the concept of the self. This would have to cease in the on-going process
if the aim is the enlightened realm of existence.
In many respects, the karmic act is
another form of the relational origination (pratiityasamutpaada) as interpreted in terms
of the ordinary conception of the perpetual turning of the wheel of life (sa.msaara).
There are both the bad deeds as well as the good ones that motivate the sa.msaaric life
due to its self-directing carving-out process. But self-directing only makes obvious the
static nature of being, whereas the inexorable Row of existence must not be hampered by
this nature, There is no time to go into the details of the defiling elements
(kle’as) relative to the flow, but suffice it to say that the Buddhist always solved
the problems within the empirical nature of things. In short, the relational origination
in its empirical nature is another way to look at the sa.msaaric nature, but it can also
be turned around or transformed into a non-empirical and ontologically absolute nature
which is another perspective of the Bow of existence from the supremely free and
unhampered nature of things. Needless to say, the Mahaayaana tradition, in general,
pursued such a course with respect to the cogency of the concept of relational
origination.(14)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the foregoing, I have attempted to
return to man the dynamics of his own process ontology. It is an ontology that should not
be confused with ontologies of the usual type. Diagram 6, which depicts the aatman
process, exhibits all the signs of constructing or continuing a deterministic system based
on the usual concept of ontology, that is, the substantiation and attribution of all the
elements of existence. It does this because each element defines its own existence or is
definable by relating to other entities with the usual ontological base. But nature is far
from a mere collection of independent or interdependent entities.
Diagram 5, on the other hand, depicts an
open moving ontology where the three temporal dimensions, with respect to the subtle
elemental plays, are accommodated without the imposition of restrictive conditions. It
addresses itself to the crucial question of delineating the continuity of being. And this
continuity of being in turn is also crucial in turn for the fact that it makes it possible
to speak of the open-ended ever-widening nature of individual process ontology which must
be the basis for the compassionate (karu.naa) and enlightened (praj~naa) natures in man.
Without this widening character of process ontology, man's nature will not be afforded the
chance to grow and develop. In this way then process ontology makes it possible to
identify the metaphysics of man and the world in a continuum or in a coterminous sense. It
is essential for man in Buddhism to move out of his restrictive aatmun-process in order to
realize the illimitable nature of the anaatman-process ontology.
I have thus expressed the desideratum for
a unique ontological turn in understanding the experiential process. The series of
diagrams only served to get a handle on the problematics of the Buddhist nature of self
(anaatman).
NOTES
1. For example. it is said that Louis de
la Vallee Poussin struggled throughout his lifetime on the question of how to accommodate
a deed (karman) with the doctrine of nonself (anaatman, nairaatmya) because both concepts
do not lend themselves readily. Toward the end or his life, he finally moved from Buddhism
as a system of contingency to Buddhism as a system of transcendency. As Maryla Falk put it
nicely:
The new understanding of Buddhism acquired
in three decades of earnest personal investigation had brought home to him that the notion
of nirvaa.na is based, not on the concept, however subtly formulated, of an unconscious
and senseless unimaginable condition or or absolute non-existence, but, primarily and
throughout the history of Buddhist thought, on the experience or the fullness of
salvation. How is this conception possible without the admission of an immortal soul?
This was the problem now unhooking itself
to its nakedness before the mind of the thinker who had lovingly devoted his life to the
subject of his research and was now preparing to Justify it, along with his life, before
the Creator. (N. N. Law, ed., editor Louis De La Vallee Poussin Memorial Volume (Calcutta:
Calcutta Oriental Press, 1940), p. 444).
Until his final days, Poussin could not
completely divest himself from his Christian orientation. It should also be noted that
Mrs. Rhys Davids drew somewhat similar conclusions concerning the anaatman concept. Her
views on the concept of a More, man's transcendent becoming nature, occupies much of her
thinking in later years in such works as Sakva or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul.
Trench, Trubner, 1931) and Wayfarer's Words (London: Luzac & Co., Vol. 1, 1940; Vol.
2, 1941). Both Poussin and Davids were formidable Buddhist thinkers in the Mahaayaana and
Theravaada traditions, respectively. They both struggled with the problematics of the
anaatman concept, as we all do, but in the final analysis offered no conclusive
explanation.
2. Majjhima Nikaaya, 63 & 64; Paali
Text Society Translation Series, No. 30; The Callection of the Middle Length Sayings, Vol.
2 (London: Luzac & Co.,1957), pp. 97-107. In the suttas, the Buddha is more interested
in the empirical nature of things, that is, the origin of suffering and release from it,
rather than pursuing impractical discourse on hypothetical or empirically groundless
states of being.
3. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and
Reality (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1929), p. 19
4. I have previously drawn some parallels
and differences in Buddhist and Whiteheadian metaphysical systems in an assay, "The
Metaphysics of Buddhist Experience and the Whiteadian Encounter, " in Philosophy
East and West 25, no. 4(1975): 465-488.
5. Richard Taylor in a fairly recent
essay, "The Anattaa Doctrine and Personal Identity" (Philosophy East and West
19, no. 4(1969); 359-366) has argued in an indirect way that the particular person or self
is one and the same thing as his body, that there is no personal self as such, and thus
everything points to the non-self doctrine. While his analysis has certain linguistic and
logical considerations as well as merits, his conclusion on the concept of anaatman is
still unconvincing from the Buddhist standpoint.
6. In a symposium essay, "Munitz'
Concept of the World... A Buddhist Response" together with a "Rejoinder to
Munitz" (Philosophy East and West 25, no. 3 (1975): 309-317, 351-352) I have argued
that Buddhism is basically stressing on the ontologically absolute nature of things rather
than the epistemological entities as such. Or, in another sense, the epistemological
structures and entities are grounded in the ontological nature.
7. Anguttara-Nikaaya I, 152, article 47;
Paali Text Society Translation Series, No, 22; The Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol. 1
(London: Luzac & Co., 1960), p. 135. The gist of the passage states thus:
"The arising is apparent, the
duration is apparent and the passing away is apparent. These are the three marks relative
to the compounded (or conditioned) nature of being." But it also goes on to state,
contrariwise and very cryptically, in the very next paragraph: "The arising is not
apparent, the duration is not apparent, and the passing away is not apparent. These are
the three marks of the uncompounded (or unconditioned) nature of being." The key
terms here are of course the compounded (sa.nkhaata) and the uncompounded (asa.nkhaata).
Their study is beyond the space of this essay, but at least the way is left open for some
understanding as the discussion proceeds in the direction of the ontological absolute
nature of things and the problematics thereof.
8. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central
Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956; First Edition printed in
London, 1923), pp. 66-67.
9. Samyutta-Nikaaya, III, 25, article 22;
Paali Text Society Translation Series, No. 18; The Book of the Kindred Sayings. Vol. 3
(London: Luzac & Co., 1954), pp. 24-31.
10. Ibid. p. 25; I have followed E. J.
Thomas' translation (reference follows).
11. Edward J. Thomas, The History of
Buddhist Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), p. 100.
12. The Milindapa~nha, 32. makes it very
clear thus. "lf I should have attachment (upaadaana), sire, I will reconnect
(pa.tisandhi)." Confer Milinda's Questions Vol. 1. translated by I. B. Horner
(London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 43. Hennry C. Warren. Buddhism in Translations
(New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 232-233.
13. For example, there are fruitful as
well as barren types of karman (A.nguttara-Nikaaya, III 33) or good and bad karman
(Sa.myutta-Nikaaya, III, 2) and that the Visuddhimagga, XIX, elaborates on the fourfold
nature of karman, that is, that which bears fruit in the present existence, that which
bears fruit in rebirth, that which bears fruit at no fixed time, and by-gone karman.
Confer, Henry C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, pp. 215-221. 226-228, 242-252.
14. The concept of relational origination
(pratiityasamutpaada) takes on a different, much more inclusive and intense, meaning in
the Mahaayaana tradition. There is no time to go into its complicated nature here but at
least it could be said that it has a profound meaning in the sa.msaaric-nirvaa.nic
identity in virtue of the novel understanding of emptiness (‘suunyataa) that is
germane to the foundational Mahaayaana suutras, including the early Praj~naapaaramitaa
texts, and the followers of that tradition. The understanding of emptiness, I believe, can
be accommodated in the ontological scheme as described in Diagram 5. Naturally, this has
to be explored further.
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